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1. Introduction: 
Islamic finance is the only example of a financial system directly based 
on the ethical precepts of a major religion, providing not only 
investment guidelines but also a set of unique investment and 
financing products.” Islamic finance is based on Shari'a, the Islamic 
law that provides guidelines for multiple aspects of Muslim life, 
including religion, politics, economics, banking, business and aspects 
of the legal system What Shari'ah compliant financing (SCF) seeks 
to do is to shape financial practices and accompanying legal 
instruments that conform to Islamic law. Major financial principles of 
Shari'ah include a ban on interest, a ban on uncertainty, adherence to 
risk-sharing and profit-sharing, promotion of ethical investments that 
enhance society and do not violate practices banned in the Qur’an 
and tangible asset-backing.(Elasrag 2011) 
Money, according to Islamic teachings is a measure of value, not a 
commodity. Debt is a relationship in which risk and responsibility are 
shared by all parties to a contract. Money must be put to practical use in 
creating real value for the participants of the transaction. It must be 
used to create, and not be a commodity in on and of itself. It because 
of this that the perception of hoarding capital, and the earning of a 
passive return on capital keyed to the passage of time, -i.e. interest – is 
prohibited. In short, money must not be made from money. 
The establishment of modern Islamic financial institutions started 
three decades ago. Currently, there are at least 70 countries that 
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have some form of Islamic financial services; almost all major 
multinational banks are offering these services. The underlying 
financial principles in Islamic finance have remained unchanged 
historically since their development over 1,400 years ago. Financial 
products must be certified as Sharia compliant by an expert in Islamic 
law. Certification requires that the transaction adheres to a  number of 
key principles that include:(Chapra 2011) 
● Backing by a tangible asset, usufruct or services, so as to avoid 
‘speculation’ (gharar). Prohibition of interest payments (riba). 
● Risk to be shared amongst participants. 
● Limitations on sale of financial assets and their use as collateral. 
● Prohibition of finance for activities deemed incompatible with 
sharia law (haram), such as alcohol, conventional financial services, 
gambling and tobacco. 
Modern Islamic finance emerged in the mid-1970s with the 
founding of the first large Islamic banks. Development initially 
occurred through marketing of a steadily expanding supply of Sharia 
compliant financial instruments. 
This supply-driven model contributed to relatively slow growth until 
the mid-1990s, since when demand has increasingly driven 
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the development of Islamic financial instruments.  Rising awareness 
and demand for Islamic products, along with supportive 
government policies and growing sophistication of financial 
institutions, have together raised the rate of 
growth. 
Two developments have been critical to the expansion of Islamic 
financial markets. In 1998, the so-called “Dow Jones Islamic 
Indexes fatwa” played a transformative role because it opened the 
door to a limited degree of “permissible impurity” in financial 
transactions and institutionalized a notion of cleansing and 
purification whereby small amounts of impermissible interest 
income could be cleansed or purified by donation to charity. In turn, 
this led to a series of equity investment tests that could be used to 
evaluate potential investments for Shari'ah compliance. A second 
critical innovation was the introduction of sukuk – a Shari'ah 
compliant substitute for bonds – where capital protection is achieved 
not as a loan but as a binding agreement by the issuer to repurchase 
certain assets over a period of time. 
Sukuk has now become one of the backbones of Islamic capital 
markets and has enabled the rapid growth of Islamic financial 
transactions. 
While the Islamic finance industry represents a fraction of the global 
finance market, it has grown at double-digit rates in recent years. By 
some  estimates, total  assets held  globally under Islamic finance 
reached $1 trillion in 2010. Islamic banks have appeared to be more 
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resilient than conventional banks to the immediate effects of the 
international financial crisis and global economic downturn. Some 
analysts have attributed this to Islamic banks’ avoidance of 
speculative activities. However, the Islamic finance industry has not 
been completely immune to the general decline in demand  and  
investor  uncertainty. Global issuance of Islamic capital market 
securities (sukuk), a fast- growing segment of the Islamic finance 
industry, peaked in 2007 at $35 billion, declined to $15 billion in 
2008 and then rose to $20 billion in 2009. with Zawya Sukuk Monitor 
reporting a 64% increase in sukuk issuance to $138bn in 2012 from 
$84bn in the previous year. This follows a recovery from a low point 
of $20bn in 2008. Sukuk made a strong start to 2013 with $59bn 
of issuance in the first half of the year. 
TheCityUK estimates that the global market for Islamic financial 
services ,as  measured  by  Sharia  compliant  assets,  reached 
$1,460bn at the end of 2012, up a fifth on the previous year. This means 
that global assets of Islamic finance have doubled since the start of the 
economic slowdown. The industry is set to grow significantly in the 
years ahead. At the current rate of growth of around 20% per year, the 
market could top $2 trillion in assets by the end of 2014.((UKIFS) 
2013) 
Assets that can be allocated to individual countries from The 
Banker’s survey reveals that the leading countries for Sharia 
compliant assets are Iran which accounts for around 36% of the global 
market, Malaysia (17%) and Saudi Arabia (14%). These are followed 
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by other Gulf states including UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, and 
then  Turkey.The  UK, in ninth place, is the leading Western 
country with $19bn of reported assets.There are over 700 institutions 
registered globally as sharia-compliant organisations in financial 
services. Of these, around 500 are fully compliant, and the  
remainder  operate  sharia-compliant products within a conventional 
institution. Countries with most of the 430 firms reporting to The 
Banker’s survey include Bahrain and Indonesia with 74 and 71 firms 
respectively. Malaysia, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in a group 
of countries with more than 50 firms.((UKIFS) 2013) 
 
The multiple reasons for the growth of the Islamic financial 
sector in recent years:(Alasrag 2010) 
(1) The flow of funds into Muslim oil-producing states; 
(2) Growing political and social desire in the Muslim world for 
financial alternatives to banking and investment institutions 
that have been historically dominated by the West; 
(3) The spreading credit crisis in global financial markets and the 
need to access new sources of investment capital; 
(4) The growth of sovereign wealth funds and the desire to have 
Shari'ah compliant instruments through which to invest them; 
and, 
(5) The rapidly accelerating number of cross-border multi- 
jurisdictional financial transactions that are possible and 
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required in a globalized world economy Assets held by 
Muslim investors worldwide now exceed $1.6 trillion, and that 
amount is expected to grow to $2.7 trillion by 2010. 
shari‘a compliant finance has become an accepted and 
vibrant element in international financial transactions. It offers a  
fresh  opportunity  to  emphasize  the  moral  and  ethical aspects 
of business and finance that reaches beyond the Arab and 
Islamic worlds to prompt a reexamination of the core  values  
underlying  all  global  financial  transactions  – making available 
the financial resources needed to develop the  human  capital  that  
will  sustain  economic  and  social progress. The main principles 
of Islamic finance include:  
(1)The prohibition of taking or receiving interest; 
(2) Capital must have a social and ethical purpose beyond 
pure,unfettered return; 
(3) Investments in businesses dealing with alcohol, gambling, drugs 
or anything else that the Shari'ah considers unlawful are deemed 
undesirable and prohibited; 
(4)A prohibition on transactions involving maysir (speculation or 
gambling); and 
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(5)A prohibition on gharar, or uncertainty about the subject- matter 
and terms of contracts – this includes a prohibition on selling 
something that one does not own. 
Because of the restriction on interest-earning investments, Islamic 
banks must obtain their earnings through profit-sharing investments 
or fee-based returns. When loans are given for business purposes, 
the lender, if he wants to make a legitimate gain under the shari‘a, 
should take part in the risk. If a lender does not take part in the risk, 
his receipt of any gain over the amount loaned is classed as interest. 
Islamic financial institutions also have the flexibility to engage in 
leasing transactions, including leasing transactions with purchase 
options. 
It may be asked why non-Muslims would agree to use Islamic finance 
structures. The principal answer is that Islamic finance provides an 
opportunity to tap into the significant funds of Islamic investors seeking 
Shari'ah compliant investments. In addition, Islamic finance can be  
combined  with  conventional  funding sources and export credit 
agency (ECA) support. 
Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to  protect the 
interests of its stakeholders. These interests may extend beyond the 
purely financial to the stakeholders’ ethical, religious, or other values. 
In the case of an institution offering Islamic financial services, 
stakeholders expect its operations to be carried out in compliance with 
the principles of Shari'ah(Islamic Law). A corporate structure that 
enables such an institution to implement good governance through 
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Shari'ah-compliant operations is therefore essential. 
As the Islamic finance industry develops further, there is a growing 
need for standardisation and professionalism across the industry. 
Coupled with this is the importance of adopting robust corporate 
governance systems of internationally recognised standards 
incorporating transparent, fair and ethical working practices. Islamic 
financial institutions are well-placed in this context, since at the heart 
of Islamic law is a vision of social development which requires all 
individuals and businesses to conduct themselves ethically and in a 
socially responsible manner. The Guiding Principles demonstrate how 
closely aligned are the basic principles of corporate governance with 
Shari'ah rules and doctrines, and consequently how IFIs are well-placed 
to  offer shareholders opportunities to participate in a broader goal 
of corporate social responsibility. The design of a corporate 
governance system in Islamic economic system entails 
implementation of a rule-based incentive system such that the 
compliance with the rules ensures an efficient governance system to 
preserve social justice and order among all members of society. This 
would imply the design of institutions and rules that induce or, if 
needed, compel managers to internalize the welfare of all 
stakeholders. The rights that are claimed for stakeholders are not ends 
in themselves-- which ought to be recognized in any form of economic 
organization--but means for protecting constituency rights. In an 
Islamic system the observance of rules of behavior guarantees 
internationalization of stakeholder rights (including those of the society 
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at large). No other institutional structure would be needed if there 
were complete adherence to Islamic rules. However, to ensure 
compliance to the Islamic rules, there is need for institutional 
arrangements. Therefore, it would be the Islamic government that 
should specify appropriate corporate governance structure, 
“incorporating all stakeholders’ rights into fiduciary duties of 
managers” of the firm on behalf of none-- investors or stakeholders. 
So no other institutional arrangement that would allow individual non-
investor stakeholders to negotiate directly with the firm would be 
necessary. Incorporating all stakeholders’ right into fiduciary duties 
of managers would be counter-productive and would lead to 
suboptimal results. The important point is that each stakeholder is 
given freedom of bargaining to protect its rights and there are 
systematic institutional arrangements in place to provide protection 
and to  mediate where disputes and disagreements arise. 
Institutional arrangements can be part of system-wide infrastructure 
surrounding the governance structure of the  firm. For example, 
because contracts are invariably incomplete, judicial interpretations 
can fill in the gaps. It is permissible to regard employment law, 
consumer law, tort law, as well as judicial rulings and administrative 
regulations, as part of the contracts that various stakeholders have 
with the firm. Similarly, the concept of Shari'ah boards is very unique 
to Islamic financial system. A Shari'ah board, consisting of fuqaha’ 
(scholars in Shari'ah matters) has been used to oversea the operation 
of a financial institution to ensure that the operations and code of 
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conduct of Islamic bank is according to the rules of Shari'ah. A 
Shari'ah board for every firm, which is seen in present architecture of 
Islamic banking, is not efficient whereas only one set of rules is 
needed for appropriate corporate governance based on the Shari'ah 
for all firms. The same idea of Shari'ah board can be extended to 
a system-level board consisting of scholars from different 
disciplines including Shari'ah, economics, finance, and commercial  
law,  to  ensure  that  rules  are  defined  and enforced so that economic 
agents fully comply with contractual obligations to all the 
stakeholders. 
This book reviews IIFS’ corporate governance (CG) challenges and 
suggests options to address them. Four main concerns motivate this 
attention to the CG of IIFS: 
1. CG is important for economic development;  
2. the assets of IIFS are significant and growing, 
3.  sound CG may be more critical for financial than other 
organizations, and  
4. the CG vulnerabilities of IIFS may not have received 
adequate attention in conventional CG frameworks 
This book is one of few papers that highlight the  importance of 
studying  corporate governance for institutions offering Islamic 
financial services. The book is of value in describing governance 
in Islamic institutions and how there are many issues under the 
investigation process, especially issues related to the Shari'ah 
Supervisory board and its functionality. One of the objectives of 
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this paper is to discuss, and create greater awareness of, some of 
the crucial issues related to corporate governance in Islamic 
financial institutions. A second, but in fact more important, 
objective is to provide, in the light of this discussion, certain 
essential guidelines to improve corporate governance in these 
institutions and thereby enable them to not only maintain their 
momentum of growth and international acceptance but also 
safeguard the interests of all stakeholders. The paper gives 
particular attention to the mechanisms for corporate governance, 
including the Board of Directors, Senior Management, 
shareholders, depositors, and regulatory and supervisory 
authorities. It also focuses on the effective management of risks 
and, in particular, on creating a supporting environment through 
moral uplift, social, legal and institutional checks, greater 
transparency, internal controls, and Shari'a as well as external 
audit. The paper also indicates briefly the shared institutions that 
are needed for effective corporate governance. 
 
II. Fundamentals of the Islamic finance 
 
One of the most important objectives of Islam is to realize greater 
justice in human society. According to the Qur’an all the messengers 
of God were sent to promote justice and any society where there is no 
justice will ultimately head towards decline and  destruction. One  of 
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the  essential requisites for ensuring justice is a set of rules or moral 
values, which everyone accepts and complies with faithfully. The 
financial system may be able to promote justice if, in addition to 
being strong and stable, it satisfies at least two conditions. One of 
these is that the financier should also share in the risk so as not to 
shift the entire burden of losses to the entrepreneur or the borrower, and 
the other is that an equitable share of the society’s financial 
resources becomes available to even the poor on affordable terms 
in keeping with their ability to repay so as to enable them to realize 
their dream of owning their own homes, pursuing higher education 
and vocational training, and establishing their own micro enterprises. 
To fulfill the first condition of justice, Islam requires both the 
financier and the entrepreneur to equitably share the profit as well as 
the loss. For this purpose, one of the basic principles of Islamic finance 
is: “No risk, no gain.” This should help introduce greater discipline 
into the financial system by motivating financial institutions to 
assess the risks more carefully and to effectively monitor the use of 
funds by borrowers. The double assessment of risks by both the 
financier and the entrepreneur should help inject greater discipline 
into the system, and go a long way in not only increasing efficiency in 
the use of resources but also reducing excessive lending.(Chapra 2011) 
Islamic finance is based on Shari'ah, an Arabic term that is often 
translated into “Islamic law”. Shari'ah provides guidelines for aspects 
of Muslim life, including religion, politics, economics, banking, 
business, and law. Shari'ah-compliant financing (SCF) constitutes 
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financial practices that conform to Islamic law.(Ilias 2010) 
Islamic finance was practiced predominantly in the Muslim world 
throughout the Middle Ages, fostering trade and business activities 
with the development of credit. In Spain and the Mediterranean and 
Baltic states, Islamic merchants became indispensable middlemen 
for trading activities. In fact, many concepts, techniques, and 
instruments of Islamic finance were later adopted by European 
financiers and businessmen. 
In contrast, the term “Islamic financial system” is relatively new, 
appearing only in the mid-1980s. In fact, all the earlier references 
to commercial or mercantile activities conforming to Islamic 
principles were made under the umbrella of either “interest free” or 
“Islamic” banking. However, describing the Islamic financial system 
simply as “interest-free” does not provide a true picture of the system 
as a whole. Undoubtedly, prohibiting the receipt and payment of 
interest is the nucleus of the system, but it is supported by other 
principles of Islamic doctrine advocating risk sharing, individuals’ 
rights and duties, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts. 
Similarly, the Islamic financial system is not limited to banking but 
covers capital formation, capital markets, and all types of financial 
intermediation. Interpreting the system as “interest free” tends to create 
confusion. The philosophical foundation of an Islamic financial system 
goes beyond the interaction of factors of production and economic 
behavior. Whereas the conventional financial system focuses primarily 
on the economic and financial aspects of transactions, the Islamic 
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system places equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social, and 
religious dimensions, to enhance equality and fairness for the good 
of society as a whole. The system can be fully appreciated only in the 
context of Islam’s teachings on the work ethic, wealth distribution, 
social and economic justice, and the role of the state. 
The Islamic financial system is founded on the absolute prohibition 
of the payment or receipt of any predetermined, guaranteed rate of 
return. This closes the door to the concept of interest and precludes the 
use of debt-based instruments. The system encourages risk-sharing, 
promotes entrepreneurship, discourages speculative behavior, and 
emphasizes the sanctity of contracts. Modern Islamic finance has 
existed internationally since the 1970s. Currently, Islamic finance 
represents a small but growing segment of the global finance 
industry. In some countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, Islamic banks 
are the only mainstream financial institutions. In others, Shari'ah-
compliant financing (SCF) exists alongside conventional banking. 
Estimates vary of the total size of assets held internationally under 
Islamic finance, generally ranging from $800 billion to $1 trillion, with 
growth rates of 10% to 15% annually over the past ten years. The 
Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia historically have been and continue 
to be the major centers for SCF. For oil producers  in  the  Gulf  
region,  Islamic  finance  may  offer investment opportunities for 
their growing revenues from oil exports. There also has been a 
growing awareness of and demand for Islamic-based financial 
products by Muslim consumers. In 2007, Iran was the largest market 
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for Islamic finance, reportedly accounting for close to 40% of 
Shari'ah- compliant financial assets worldwide.6 However, according 
to some analysts, the reach of Iran’s Islamic finance market may be 
limited because of international sanctions. Following Iran, the largest 
Islamic finance markets in 2007 were Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Support for Islamic 
finance varies in the Middle East. In some countries, such as Libya 
and Morocco, Islamic banks are considered by some to be tied to 
Islamic political parties and consequently have been refused licenses. 
Other countries, including Jordan, Tunisia, and the Sudan, have been 
receptive to Islamic finance, viewing Islamic financial products as an 
opportunity for creating capital and fostering economic development. 
In recent years, SCF has expanded to other parts of the world. Islamic 
finance is growing in Europe and North America, areas in which 
Muslims are in the minority. In August 2004, the United Kingdom’s 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) approved a banking license for 
the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the country’s first Islamic bank. 
The IBB would serve the consumer market with Shari'ah-compliant 
products. In March 2006, the FSA licensed the European Islamic 
Investment Bank as the United Kingdom’s first independent bank for 
Shari'ah-compliant investments. In 1999, the Dow Jones presented its 
first Islamic market index, which follows Shari'ah-compliant stocks 
internationally. The Dow Jones maintains more than 70 indices in its 
Islamic series and is advised by an independent Shari'ah Supervisory 
Board counsel. 
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A. Shari'ah law defined 
 
 
Shari'ah(or Islamic) law is meant to regulate all aspects of a 
Muslim's way of life. It is broadly divided into two sets of rules: one 
relates to the obligatory worship of God (ibadah) and the other relates 
to daily life outside the context of obligatory worship (muamalat), 
including commercial and financial  dealings. Shari'ah is not a codified 
body of law. It consists of general rules and principles derived from 
the Qur'an (the Muslim holy book), the practices (sunnah) and 
sayings (ahadith) of the Prophet Mohammed (as discussed in further 
detail below). These general principles are capable of interpretation 
and development to address new issues or circumstances that arise from 
time to time. Indeed, the Shari'ah has been supplemented by extensive 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) developed over centuries by different 
schools of thought (the madhaa'hib). The key point to note is that, 
while all the schools of thought agree on the fundamental  Shari'ah 
principles enshrined in the Qur'an, sunnah and hadith, they sometimes 
hold differing views on their interpretation and application. 
B. Sources of Shari'ah law 
 
 
Shari'ahl aw is derived from a number of primary and secondary 
sources.(LLP 2009) 
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1. Qur'an 
The Qur'an is a primary source of law and is believed by Muslims to 
contain the word of God as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. 
Evidence found in other sources of Shari'ah law is subject to the 
Qur'an. 
2. Sunnah 
Sunnah literally means "well known path". The Sunnah is a primary 
source of law and comprises traditional accounts of what the Prophet 
Mohammed said or did during his life 
Which have legal content. Sunnah also comprises the sayings of others 
tacitly approved by the Prophet's silence. 
3. Hadith 
A further primary source of law is the narrative record of sayings and 
actions of the Prophet Mohammed known as hadith (plural ahadith). 
The extent to which sunnah is derived or differentiated from ahadith 
depends on the context and school of thought being considered. 
4. Qiyas 
 
 
Qiyas represents the process of reasoning whereby the principles 
found in the Qur'an and sunnah are extended to new cases by analogy. 
5. Ijma 
Ijma represents the consensus of the Islamic community (whether 
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at a local or global academic level) on a particular issue. 
6. Ijtihad 
Ijtihad is the interpretation and the opinion of Islamic jurists on a 
particular issue. Qiyas,ijma and ijtihad are all secondary sources of 
Shari'ah law. 
C. Issues relating to interpretation and application of  
Shari'ah law 
 
Since Shari'ah law is not a single codified body of law and is open 
to interpretation, the opinions of Shari'ah scholars may differ on the 
same question of Shari'ah law depending on the school of thought 
to which particular scholars belong. In addition, scholars' views on 
questions of Shari'ah law may change over time. This can lead to 
uncertainty and inconsistency of interpretation and application of 
Shari'ah law across the Islamic world.(Ayub 2009, LLP 2009) 
1. Key Shari'ah principles and prohibitions 
relevant to finance 
There are a number of key Shari'ah principles and prohibitions 
relevant to finance and commercial transactions which distinguish 
Islamic finance from the conventional forms. For completeness, it 
should be mentioned that there are two main branches within Islam: 
sunnism and shiaism. The majority of Muslims are sunni and the 
following is limited to the discussion of the general Shari'ahprinciples 
relating to Islamic finance within sunni jurisprudence. The key 
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Shari'ah principles which underpin Islamic finance, and have led to 
the creation of a separate finance industry, are as follows: 
a) Prohibition on usury and interest (riba) 
Prohibition of interest. Prohibition of riba, a term literally meaning 
“an excess” and interpreted as “any unjustifiable increase of capital 
whether in loans or sales” is the central tenet of the system. More 
precisely, any positive, fixed, predetermined rate tied to the maturity 
and the amount of principal (i.e., guaranteed regardless of the 
performance of the investment) is considered riba and is prohibited. 
The general consensus among Islamic scholars is that riba covers not 
only 
Usury but also the charging of “interest” as widely practiced. This 
prohibition is based on arguments of social justice, equality, and 
property rights. Islam encourages the earning of profits but forbids 
the charging of interest because profits, determined ex post, 
symbolize successful entrepreneurship and creation of additional 
wealth whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that is accrued 
irrespective of the outcome of business operations and may not 
create wealth if there are business losses. Social justice demands 
that borrowers and lenders share rewards as well as losses in an 
equitable fashion and that the process of wealth accumulation and 
distribution in the economy be fair and representative of true 
productivity. 
Under the Shari'ah, it is not permissible to charge, pay or receive 
interest. The Shari'ah does not recognize the time value of money 
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and it is therefore not permissible to make money by lending it. 
Money must be used to create real economic value and it is only 
permissible to earn a return from investing money in permissible 
commercial activities which involve the financier or investor taking 
some commercial risk. This prohibition is the main driving force 
behind the development of the modern Islamic finance industry. Riba 
can take one of two forms: riba al- naseeyah and riba al-fadl. 
1- Riba al-naseeyah is the amount of excess received by a lender 
in addition to the capital amount lent. This type of riba is comparable 
to the traditional concept of interest in conventional lending 
activities. 
2- The second type, riba al-fadl, is excess compensation without any 
form of consideration in return. 
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In modern finance, riba al-fadl could be applicable to several 
exchange of commodities contracts. 
The idea is that when compensation is paid, it should be justified or be 
set against a specific activity and the return should also be associated 
with a specific risk. Therefore when parties exchange commodities of 
similar value and one party pays excessive compensation to the other 
party, this is 
Considered riba. 
b) Prohibition on realising a gain from 
speculation (mayseer) 
 
It is not permissible to earn a profit from speculation. Gambling is 
therefore not permitted under Shari'ah. Any contracts or 
arrangements which involve speculation are also not permitted. That 
said, it is accepted under the Shari'ah that there is an element of 
speculation in most commercial arrangements and, unlike the absolute 
prohibition of interest, it is a question of the degree of speculation 
involved and whether the intention behind the transaction is to realise 
a gain from some productive effort or purely speculation. 
The distinction between prohibited speculation and legitimate 
commercial speculation is not always clear in practice and there are 
examples where it can be difficult to distinguish between the two. For 
example, it is generally accepted that it is permissible to make an 
equity investment in a company  Engaging in a business activity that 
is permissible under the Shari'ah with a view to realising future 
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dividends and capital gains on the investment. There is of course a 
degree of commercial speculation involved about the future prospects 
of the company when an investor makes an equity investment, but 
whether such speculation is permissible or not would depend on the 
intention of the investor, i.e. was the intention to make a quick profit 
by speculating in the likely movement of the share price over a very 
short period of time (as is arguably the case with day trading), or was 
the decision made on the basis of careful evaluation of the company's 
past results and future prospects? 
At the other end of the spectrum, equity derivatives such as index-
linked derivatives are generally viewed as unacceptable under 
Shari'ah because they involve speculation on the movement of an 
equity index. 
c) No uncertainty (gharar) in commercial 
transactions 
 
Certainty of terms in any transaction is a key requirement under the 
Shari'ah. Again, as with speculation, a degree of commercial 
uncertainty is acceptable but there must not be any uncertainty about 
the key terms of the transaction. For example, in a transaction for the 
sale of assets, the sale contract should set out a clear description of 
the assets being sold, the sale price and the time for delivering the 
assets to the purchaser. Similarly, 
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a leasing contract needs to set out clearly the assets which are being 
leased, the duration of the lease and the rent payable under the lease. 
One of the reasons that conventional insurance contracts are not 
considered permissible under the Shari'ah is that there is no certainty 
as to when a claim will be paid, given that there is no way of knowing 
if and when the insured event will occur. In the context of modern 
day Islamic finance, key examples of gharar are:(LLP 2009) 
(a) Advising a customer to buy shares of a particular company that is 
the subject of a takeover bid, on the grounds that its share price can be 
expected to rise; 
(b) Buying a house, the price of which is to be specified in the future; 
(c) When the subject matter or specifications to a contract are 
unknown; and 
(d) Deferred payment under a contract where the deferment is for an 
unknown period. 
d) All activity must be for permitted purposes 
(halal) 
 
Muslims must not engage in (or derive any benefit from) activities 
which are prohibited under the Shari'ah. It is therefore not permissible 
for Muslims to invest in businesses which engage in prohibited 
activities such as casinos, a breweries or a factories making pork 
products. It is also not permissible for Islamic banks to provide 
any financing to such businesses. However, a very strict 
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interpretation of these rules would mean that Muslims would only 
be able to invest in a very limited number of businesses 
internationally. For example, it would not be permissible for Muslims 
to invest in a hotel that serve alcohol, a food company which also 
manufactures pork products as part of its product range or any business 
that lends or borrows money at interest. 
In light of the practical considerations of international commerce and 
in order to enable Muslim investors to participate in it, a number of 
prominent Shari'ah scholars have advanced the view that it is 
permissible for Muslims to invest in businesses or companies which 
are not entirely Shari'ah compliant so long as certain conditions are 
met. These conditions include (among other things): 
(a) The principal business activity must be permissible under 
Shari'ah; 
(b) Any income derived from prohibited activities should only form 
a small percentage of the overall income of the company or business 
(this percentage ranges from 5 to 20 per cent. Of overall income 
depending upon the nature of the prohibited activity and the 
Shari'ah scholars involved); 
(c) The aggregate amount of interest-bearing debt incurred by a 
company or business must not exceed a certain percentage of 
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its assets or market capitalisation (there are disagreements between 
Shari'ah scholars as to what percentage is acceptable and it ranges 
from 25 to 35 per cent. of total assets or market capitalisation 
depending upon the scholars involved); and 
(d) The accounts receivable of the company on the business must 
not exceed a certain percentage of its assets or market capitalisation 
(usually set between 25 and 33 per cent.). 
e) Making Money from Money is not 
Permissible 
One of the wrong presumptions on which all theories of interest are 
based is that money is a commodity. It is, therefore, argued that just as 
a merchant can sell his commodity for a higher price than his cost, he 
can also sell his money for a higher price than its face value, or just 
as he can lease his property and can charge a rent against it, he can 
also lend his money and can claim interest thereupon. Islamic 
principles, however, do not subscribe to this presumption. Money 
and  commodity have different characteristics and, therefore, they are 
treated differently. 
The basic points of difference between money and 
commodity:- 
(a) Money has no intrinsic utility. It cannot be utilized in direct 
fulfillment of human needs. It can only be used for acquiring some 
goods or services. A commodity, on the other hand, has intrinsic utility 
and can be utilized directly without exchanging it for some other thing. 
(b) Commodities can be of different qualities while money has no 
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quality except that it is a measure of value or a medium of exchange. 
Therefore, all the units of money of the same denomination, are 
hundred per cent equal to each other. An old and dirty note of SR.100 
has the same value as a brand new note of SR.100. 
(c) In commodities, the transactions of sale and purchase are effected 
on an identified particular commodity. If A has purchased a 
particular car by pinpointing it, and seller has agreed, he deserves 
to receive the same car. The seller cannot compel him to take the 
delivery of another car, though of the same type or quality. Money, 
on the contrary, cannot be pinpointed in a transaction of exchange. If 
A has purchased a commodity from B by showing him a particular 
note of 100 SR.100 he can still pay him another note of the same 
denomination. 
Based on these basic differences, Islamic  Shari'ah has treated money 
differently from commodities, especially on two scores: Firstly, money 
(of the same denomination) is not held to be the subject matter of trade, 
like other commodities. Its use has been restricted  to  its  basic  purpose  
i.e.  to  act  as  a  medium  of exchange and a measure of value. 
Secondly, if for exceptional reasons,  money  has  to  be  exchanged  
for  money  or  it  is borrowed, the payment on both sides must be equal, 
so that it is not used for the purpose it is not meant for i.e. trade in 
money itself. In short, money is treated as "potential" capital. It becomes 
actual capital only when it joins hands with other resources to 
undertake a productive activity. Islam recognizes the time value of 
money, but only when it acts as capital, not when it is "potential" 
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capital. 
 
2. Regulation of Islamic Finance 
Financial institutions seeking to offer Shari'ah-compliant products 
typically have a Shari'ah supervisory board (or at a minimum, a 
Shari'ah counselor). The Shari'ah board is to review and approve 
financial practices and activities for compliance with Islamic 
principles. Such expertise raises the attractiveness of Shari'ah- 
compliant financial intermediaries to investors considering Islamic 
banking.International institutions have been established to promote 
international consistency in Islamic finance. The Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), 
founded in 1991 and located in Bahrain, issues international standards 
on accounting, auditing, and corporate governance. It has 200 
members from 45 countries; its membership includes central banks, 
Islamic financial institutions, and other bodies in the Islamic banking 
and finance industry. Another regulatory body is the Islamic 
Financial Services Boards (IFSB), which began operations in 2003 and 
is based in Malaysia. IFSB puts forth standards for supervision and 
regulation. Many leading Islamic financial centers around the world 
have adopted international SCF regulation standards.U.S. federal 
banking regulators have provided some formal guidance about Islamic 
products. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
issued two directives concerning Shari'ah compliant mortgage 
products. In 1997, the OCC issued guidance about ijara (“lease”), a 
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financial structure in which the financial intermediary purchases and 
subsequently leases an asset to a consumer for a fee. In 1999, the 
OCC recognized murabaha (“cost-plus”), under which the financial 
intermediary buys an asset for a customer with the understanding 
that the customer will buy the asset back for a higher fee. 
Standardization of Islamic finance regulations has been of increasing 
interest  in the industry. Shari'ahis  open to interpretation and Islamic 
scholars are not in complete agreement regarding what constitutes SCF. 
Islamic finance laws and regulatory practices vary across countries. 
The lack of concurrent viewpoints makes it difficult to standardize 
Islamic financing. 
Standardization also may be challenging because the maturity of 
Islamic finance markets varies from country to country, with some 
markets well-established and others that are more nascent.   Without   
standardization,   some   industry   officials express concern that 
Shari'ah-compliance risk may grow. The lack of standardization 
across Islamic finance markets raises legal uncertainty that a contract 
will not be recognized as valid under Islamic law by all Islamic 
scholars. This uncertainty has been highlighted by a recent dispute 
between Lebanon’s Blom Bank and Kuwait’s Islamic firm Investment 
Dar over whether or not a contract between the two entities was 
compliant with Islamic principles and if payment should be made. 
Many observers view standardization of SCF regulations as important 
in increasing the marketability and acceptance of Islamic products. 
Over the years, there have been numerous initiatives to improve 
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regulatory practices. For example, in 2009, the IFSB published guiding 
principals on issues such as governance and capital adequacy 
requirements for various financial products. The AAOIFI is in the 
process of developing new standards in risk management and 
corporate governance. 
1. Basic Islamic financial instruments 
Islamic markets offer different instruments to satisfy providers and 
users of funds in a variety of ways: sales, trade financing, and 
investment. Basic instruments include cost-plus financing 
(murabaha), profit-sharing (mudaraba) ,leasing (ijara), partnership 
(musharaka) ,and for ward sale (bay’ salam), Deferred-payment sale 
(bay’ mu’ajjal) and deferred-delivery sale (bay’salam) contracts, in 
addition to spot sales, are used for conducting credit sales. In a deferred-
payment sale, delivery of the product is taken on the spot but delivery 
of the payment is delayed for an agreed period. Payment can be made 
in a lump sum or in installments, provided there is no extra charge for 
the delay. A deferred-delivery sale is similar to a forward contract 
where delivery of the product is in the future in exchange for 
payment on the spot market. 
These instruments serve as the basic building blocks for developing 
a wide array of more complex financial instruments, suggesting that 
there is great potential for financial innovation and expansion in 
Islamic financial markets. 
There are several methods of Islamic financing. However, in the world 
of commercial financing and more particularly, project financing, 
35  
  
certain methods are more commonly encountered than others. These 
are set out below. 
 
A. Trade with markup or cost-plus sale (murabaha). One 
of the most widely used instruments for short-term financing is 
based on the traditional notion of purchase finance. The investor 
undertakes to supply specific goods or commodities, 
incorporating a mutually agreed contract for resale to the client and 
a mutually negotiated margin. 
Around 75 percent of Islamic financial transactions are cost-plus sales. 
Murabaha was originally an exchange transaction in which a trader 
purchases items required by an end user. The trader then sells those 
items to the end-user at a price that is calculated using an agreed 
profit margin over the costs incurred by the trader. 
To be in consonance  with the  principles of Islamic finance 
governing exchange transactions every murabaha transaction must 
meet the following conditions: 
Murabaha transactions may be undertaken only where the client of a 
bank, or financial institution, wants to purchase a commodity. This 
type of transaction cannot be effected in cases where the client wants 
to get funds for a purpose other than purchasing a commodity, like 
payment of salaries, settlement of bills or other liabilities. 
To make it a valid transaction it is necessary that the commodity is 
really purchased by the bank and it comes into the ownership and 
possession (physical or constructive) of the bank so that it may assume 
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the risk of the commodity so far as it remains under its ownership and 
possession. 
After acquiring the ownership and possession of the commodity it 
should be sold to the client through a valid sale. 
Some quarters have equated murabahah transactions to interest-
based loans. However, there are many significant factors that 
distinguish a murabaha contract from a riba-based one. Some of them 
are the following: 
In the event of default by the end user, the financer only has recourse  
to  the  items  financed,  and  no  further  mark-up  or penalty may be 
applied to the sum outstanding. This means that the amount to be repaid 
does not go on increasing with passage of time as in the case of 
amounts borrowed from conventional banks on interest. Also, in 
conventional financing, the bank gives loans to its clients without 
ever being concerned how the money is being put to use. 
In the event of a murabahah transaction, no money is loaned to the 
client. Rather, the financing party purchases the goods himself, 
based on the requirement of the client. This ensures that financing  
is always asset-based. In  effect, this type  of financing creates real 
assets and inventories.Another major difference between a murabahah 
contract and an interest-based one is that the financier cannot be 
unconcerned about the purposes for which the asset being leased is to 
be put to use. Conventional banks have no compunction in lending to 
gambling houses or liquor companies, or even pornographic 
filmmakers.Islamic principles of finance are based on a well-established 
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rule which dictates that “The benefit of a thing is a return for the 
liability for loss from that thing”. Hence, in a murabahah transaction 
the bank or financier assumes the risk by purchasing the commodity 
before he sells it at a markup. This mark up is considered as the reward 
of the risk he assumes. Interest-bearing loans assume no risks 
whatsoever. In other words, because the bank takes title to the goods, 
and is therefore engaged in buying and selling, its profit derives from a 
real service that entails a certain risk. This aspect lends the 
transaction legitimacy. 
Most scholars have ruled that, to serve as a deterrent to such as may 
willfully delay payments, the financer may get the buyer to agree, at 
the time of the contract, to make a pre-specified donation to an 
agreed charity in case of late payment of monthly installments. 
These scholars, however, caution that this device should be used 
to the minimum extent and only in cases where musharakah or 
mudarabah are not practicable for one reason or another. 
B. Profit-sharing agreement (mudaraba). This is identical 
to an investment fund in which managers handle a pool of funds. 
The agent-manager has relatively limited liability while having 
sufficient incentives to perform. The capital is invested in broadly 
defined activities, and the terms of profit and risk sharing are 
customized for each investment. The maturity structure ranges 
from short to medium term and is more suitable for trade activities. 
Mudaraba implies a contract between two parties whereby one party, 
the rabb al-mal (beneficial owner or the sleeping partner), entrusts 
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money to the other party called the mudarib (managing trustee or the 
labour partner). The mudarib is to utilize it in an agreed manner and 
then returns to the rabb al-mal the principal and the pre-agreed share of 
the profit. He keeps for himself what remains of such profits. 
The following rules must govern all Mudaraba transactions.( AHMAD, 
A., & KHAN, M. T. A.1998 ) 
• The division of profits between the two parties must necessarily 
be on a proportional basis and cannot be a lump sum or 
guaranteed return. 
• The investor is not liable for losses beyond the capital he has 
contributed. The mudarib does not share in the losses except for 
the loss of his time and efforts. 
• Briefly, an Islamic bank lends money to a client to finance a 
factory, for example, in return for which the bank will get a 
specified percentage of the factory's net profits every year for 
a designated period. This share of the profits provides for 
repayment of the principal and a profit for the bank to pass on 
to its depositors. Should the factory lose money, the bank, its 
depositors and the borrower all jointly absorb the losses, thereby 
putting into practice the pivotal Islamic principle that the 
providers and users of capital should share risks and rewards. 
Islamic banks use this instrument to finance those seeking 
investments to run their own enterprises or professional units, 
whether they be physicians or engineers or traders or craftsmen. The 
bank provides the adequate finance as a capital owner in exchange of 
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a share in the profit to be agreed upon. 
It is worth noting that this mode is a high risk for the bank 
because the bank  delivers  capital to the mudarib who undertakes 
the work and management and the mudarib shall only be a guarantor 
in case of negligence and trespass. Islamic banks usually take the 
necessary precautions to decrease the risk and to guarantee a better 
execution for the mudaraba and pursue this objective with seriousness. 
However, it may be noted that, under mudarabah, the liability of the 
financier is limited to the extent of his contribution to the capital, 
and no more. 
C. Equity participation (musharaka). This is analogous to 
a classical joint venture. Both entrepreneur and investor 
contribute to the capital (assets, technical and managerial 
expertise, working capital, 
etc.) of the operation in varying degrees and agree to share the returns 
(as well as the risks) in proportions agreed to in advance. 
Traditionally,this form of transaction has been used for financing fixed 
assets and working capital of medium- and long-term duration. 
Musharaka is a partnership, normally of limited duration, formed to 
carry out a specific project. 
It is, therefore, similar to a Western-style joint venture, and is also 
regarded by some as the purest form of Islamic financial instrument, 
since it conforms to the underlying partnership principles of sharing 
in, and benefiting from, risk. Participation in a musharaka can either 
be in a new project, or by providing additional funds for an existing 
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one. Profits are divided on a pre- determined basis, and any losses 
shared in proportion to the capital contribution. In this case, the 
bank enters into a partnership with a client in which both share the 
equity capital- and maybe even the management -of a project or deal, 
and both share in the profits or losses according to their equity 
shareholding. There are two basic types of musharaka: 
i. Sharikah al milk: partnership based on joint ownership. This may 
be voluntary e.g. in the purchase of a ship, or involuntary 
e.g. as a result of inheritance. 
ii. Sharikah al uqud: partnership based on a contractual relationship. 
There are five subdivisions: 
1. Sharikat al Mufawadah (full authority and obligation): a limited 
partnership with equal capital contributions, responsibility, full 
authority on behalf of others, and  responsibility for liabilities,incurred 
through the normal course of business. 
2. Sharikat al Inan (restricted authority and obligation): a limited 
partnership with unequal capital contributions. They do not share 
equal responsibility, and this reflects their share of the profits. 
3. Sharikat al Wujuh (goodwill /credit worthiness): companies based 
on the reputation of one or both parties, typically small scale business. 
4. Sharikat al Abdan (labour, skill and management): a company based 
on the contribution of  human efforts,  no capital contributions, again, 
typically small scale business. 
5. Sharikat al Mudaraba: a mudaraba 
41  
  
D. Leasing (ijara). Another popular instrument, accounting 
for about 10 percent of Islamic financial transactions, is 
leasing. Leasing is designed for financing
 vehicles, machinery, equipment, and aircraft. 
Different forms of leasing are permissible, including leases where a 
portion of the installment payment goes toward the final purchase 
(with the transfer of ownership to the lessee). 
 
Ijarah can be defined as a process by which " usufruct of a 
particular property is transferred to another person in exchange for a 
rent claimed from him/her". In many respects, Ijarah resembles leasing 
as it is practiced in today’s commercial world. The distinguishing 
feature of this mode is that the assets remain the property of the Islamic 
bank to put them up for rent every time the lease period terminates 
so as not to remain unutilized for long periods of time. Under ijarah 
the bank or the leasing company assumes the risk of recession or 
diminishing demand for these assets. 
To be in consonance  with the  principles of Islamic finance 
governing financial transactions every ijarah transaction must meet 
the following conditions.(Ghuddah, 1998 ) 
• It is a condition that the object leased must not be perishable 
or consumable. 
• The lease is for the utilization not the consumption of the asset. 
• It is a condition that the subject of the contract must 
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actually and legally be attainable. It is not permissible to lease 
something that cannot be delivered. 
• The lessee must ensure that the asset is used for the purpose 
it is made for. The lessee shall comply with the provisions of 
the contract. The lessee also shall not benefit from the asset in a 
way more than what has been agreed upon. 
• It is not permitted to lease real estate to be used as an interest 
based bank or a bar. However it is permissible to lease property 
to those whose major activities are permissible or halal even 
if they include some secondary prohibited practices. 
• The lessor must not only deliver the asset on time, on the date of 
commencement of lease, but also ensure that the lessor delivers 
those accessories as well which are essential for the lessee to 
benefit from the asset as per the norms. 
• The lease contract must state the lease period clearly. Renewal 
terms must also be stated clearly, and things like the rentals for 
all subsequent years, after the first year, should not mention 
clauses like ‘left to the sole discretion of the lessor’ and the like. 
• The rental must be money. The lease rent falls due from the 
receipt of the asset by the lessee, not the date the contract is 
signed. 
• The amount and timing of the lease payments should be agreed 
in advance. However, the agreed schedule and amount of those 
payments need not be uniform. 
• It is permissible for the two parties to agree during the lease 
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period to review the lease period or the rental or both. That is 
because the lease contract occurs periodically unlike the sale 
contract where the transfer of ownership is immediate. 
• The lessor bears the liabilities when leasing the asset such as 
damage to the asset, payment of premium cost and basic 
maintenance. 
• There is no objection to authorizing the lessee to undertake all 
the above but the costs thereof must be borne by the 
lessor/owner. 
• The lessor/owner bears all the costs of the legally binding basic 
maintenance and these are operations on which the permanence 
and suitability of the leased object depend. 
The lessor also bears the cost of the replacement of durable 
parts. However, it is permissible to  make the lessee bear the 
cost of ordinary routine maintenance, because this cost is 
normally known and can be considered as part of the rental. 
• The conditions of usage of the leased items must be stated. 
The lessor must have full possession and legal ownership of 
the asset prior to leasing it. 
• A price cannot be pre-determined for the sale of the asset at the 
expiry of the lease. However, lessor and lessee may agree to the 
continuation of the lease or the sale of the leased asset to the 
lessee under a new agreement at the end of the initial lease 
period. 
• In the event of late payment of rental, the Ijarah may be 
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terminated immediately. 
• The lessor may claim compensation for any damage caused to 
the leased assets as a result of negligence on the part of the 
lessee. 
Literally, Ijarah means to give something on rent. As a term of 
Islamic Fiqh, Ijarah can also refer to wages paid to a person in 
consideration of the services rendered by him/her. In the above 
discussion, the term Ijarah is used to represent the usufructs of assets 
and properties, and not to the services of human beings. 
 
 
E. Salam is one of the basic conditions for the validity of sale 
in Shari'ahthat the commodity intended to be sold must be in the 
physical or constructive possession of the seller. This condition has 
three implications: 
First, the commodity must be existing; a commodity that does not 
exist at the time of sale cannot be sold. 
Second, the seller should have acquired the ownership of that 
commodity. If the commodity exists but the seller does not own it, he 
cannot sell it to anybody. 
Third, mere ownership is not enough. It should have come in the 
possession of the seller, either physically or constructively. If the seller 
owns a commodity, but he has not acquired its delivery by himself or 
through an agent, he cannot sell it. 
There are only two exceptions to this general principle in shari‘a 
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. One is Salam and the other is Istisna. Both are 
sales of a special nature. 
Salam, or Bay-Salaam as it is also called, is a sale whereby the seller 
undertakes to supply some specific goods to the buyer at a future date 
in exchange for an advanced price fully paid on the spot. 
Here the price is paid in cash, but the supply of the purchased goods 
is deferred. The buyer is called "Rabb-us-Salam", the seller is 
"Muslam ilaih", the cash price is "ra's-ul-mal", and the purchased 
commodity is termed as "muslam fih". 
The Shari'ah allows Salam subject to certain conditions. The basic 
purpose of this sale was to meet the needs of the small farmers who 
needed money to grow their crops and to feed their family up to the time 
of their harvest. After the prohibition of riba they could not take 
usurious loans. Therefore, it was allowed for them to sell the 
agricultural products in advance. 
Similarly, the traders of Arabia used to export goods to other places 
and to import other goods to their homeland. They needed money to 
undertake this type of business. They could not borrow from the 
usurers after the prohibition of riba. It was, therefore, allowed for them 
that they sell the goods in advance. After receiving their cash price, 
they could easily undertake the aforesaid business. Salam was 
beneficial to the seller, because he received the price in advance, and 
it was beneficial to the buyer also, because normally, the price in 
Salam used to be lower than price in spot sales. 
The permissibility of Salam was an exception to the general rule that 
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prohibits forward sales. Therefore, it was subjected to some strict 
conditions. 
Conditions of Salam: 
It is necessary for the validity of Salam that the buyer pays the price 
in full to the seller at the time of effecting the sale. This is necessary 
because in the absence of full payment by the buyer, it will be 
tantamount to a sale of debt against debt, which is expressly 
prohibited. Moreover, the basic wisdom behind the permissibility of 
Salam is to fulfill the instant needs of the seller. If the price is not paid 
to him in full, the basic purpose of the transaction will be defeated. 
Salam can be effected in those commodities only whose quality and 
quantity can be specified exactly. The things whose quality or quantity 
is not determined by the specification cannot be sold through the 
contract of Salam. For example, the precious stones cannot be sold on 
the basis of Salam, because every piece of precious stones is normally 
different from the other either in its quality or in its size or weight and 
their exact specification is not generally possible. 
Salam cannot be effected on a particular commodity or on a product 
of a particular field or farm. 
For example, if the seller undertakes to supply wheat of a 
particular field, or the fruit of a particular tree, the Salam will not be 
valid, because there is a possibility that produce of that particular 
field or the fruit of that tree is destroyed before the delivery, and 
in the presence of this possibility the delivery remains uncertain. 
The same rule is applicable to every commodity whose supply is not 
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certain. It is necessary that the quality of the commodity (intended 
to be purchased through Salam) be fully specified leaving no 
ambiguity that may lead to dispute. All the possible details in this 
respect must be expressly mentioned. 
It is also necessary that the quantity of the commodity be agreed upon 
in unequivocal terms. If the commodity is quantified in weights 
according to the usage of its traders, its weight must be determined, and 
if it is quantified through measures, its exact measure should be 
known. What is normally weighed cannot be specified in measures and 
vice versa. 
The exact date of delivery must be specified in the contract. Salam 
cannot be effected in respect of those things that must be delivered 
at the spot. For example, if gold is purchased in exchange for 
silver, it is necessary, according to  Shari'ah, that the delivery of 
both be simultaneous. Here, Salam cannot work. Similarly,  if  wheat  
is  bartered  for  barley,  the  simultaneous delivery of both is 
necessary for the validity of sale, therefore, the contract of Salam in 
this case is not allowed. 
It is permissible to draw a Salam sale contract on one whole thing 
but to be possessed at different times in specific parts. 
Salam sale is not permissible on existing commodities because damage 
and deterioration cannot be assured before delivery on the due date. 
Delivery may become impossible. 
Salam is permissible on a commodity of a specific locality if it is 
assured that it is almost always available in that locality and it rarely 
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becomes unavailable. 
The place of delivery must be stated in the contract if the 
commodity needs loading or transportation expenses.It is permissible 
to take mortgage and guarantor on Salam debt to guarantee that the 
seller satisfies his obligation by delivering the commodity sold, which 
is a liability on the due date. 
It is not permissible for the buyer of a Salam commodity to sell it 
before receiving it because that is similar to the prohibited sale of debts 
before holding. It is known that the Salam commodity is a liability debt 
on the seller and not an existing commodity. Instead of that, it is 
permissible for the buyer to draw a parallel Salam contract without 
connecting it to the first Salam contract. Salam sale is suitable for the 
finance of agriculture operations, where the bank can transact with 
farmers who are expected to have the commodity in plenty during 
harvest either from their own crops or crops of others, which they can 
buy and deliver in case their crops fail. Thus the bank renders great 
services to the farmers in their way to achieve their production targets. 
Salam sale is also used to finance commercial and industrial 
activities, especially phases prior to production and export of 
commodities and that is by purchasing them on Salam and 
marketing them for lucrative prices. 
The Salam sale is applied by banks in financing craftsmen and small 
producers by supplying them with inputs of production as a Salam 
capital in exchange for some of their commodities to remarket. 
The scope of Salam sale is large enough to cover the needs of various 
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people such as farmers, industrialists, contractors or traders. It can 
cover the finance of operational costs and capital goods. 
F. Istisna is the second kind of sale where a commodity 
is transacted before it comes into existence. 
It means to order a manufacturer to manufacture a specific 
commodity for the purchaser. If the manufacturer undertakes to 
manufacture the goods for him, the transaction of Istisna comes into 
existence. But it is necessary for the validity of Istisna that the price 
is fixed with the consent of the parties and that necessary specification 
of the commodity (intended to be manufactured) is fully settled 
between them. 
The contract of Istisna creates a moral obligation on the manufacturer 
to manufacture the goods, but before he starts the work, any one of the 
parties may cancel the contract after giving notice to the other. 
But after the manufacturer has started the work, the contract cannot 
be cancelled unilaterally. 
However, the party placing the order has the right to retract if the 
commodity does not conform to the specifications demanded. 
Istisna as a Mode of Financing: can be used for providing the facility 
of financing in certain transactions, especially in the sector of 
house financing. 
If the client has his own land and he seeks financing for the 
construction  of  a  house,  the  financier  may  undertake  to construct 
the house on that open land, on the basis of Istisna, and if the client 
has no land and he wants to purchase the land also, the financier may 
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undertake to provide him a constructed house 
on the specified piece of land. 
Since it is not necessary in Istisna that the price is paid in advance, 
nor is it necessary that it is paid at the time of the delivery, rather, 
it may be deferred to any time according to the agreement of the parties, 
therefore, the time of payment may be fixed in whatever manner they 
wish. The payment may also be in installments. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary that the financier himself 
construct the house. He can enter into a parallel contract of Istisna 
with a third party, or may hire the services of a contractor (other than 
the client). In both cases, he can calculate his cost and fix the price of 
Istisna with his client in a manner that may give him a reasonable 
profit over his cost. The payment of installments by the client may 
start, in this case, right from the day when the contract of Istisna is 
signed by the parties, and may continue during the construction of the 
house and after it is handed over to the client. In order to secure the 
payments of installments, the bank, as a security, may keep the title 
deeds of the house or land, or any other property, until the client pays 
the last installment. The bank, in this case, will be responsible for the 
construction of the house in full conformity with the specifications 
detailed in the agreement. In case of discrepancy, the financier will 
undertake such alterations at his own cost as may be necessary for 
bringing it in harmony with the terms of the contract. 
The instrument of Istisna may also be used for project financing on 
similar lines. If a client wants to install machinery in his factory, 
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and the machinery needs to be manufactured, the financier may 
undertake to prepare the machinery through the contract of Istisna 
according to the aforesaid procedure. The same principles will be 
fully applicable to the construction of a building for the industry. 
Istisna contracts open wide fields of application for the Islamic banks 
to finance the public needs and the vital interests of the society to 
develop the Islamic economy. Istisna contracts are applied in high 
technology industries such as the aircraft industry, locomotive and 
ship building industries, in addition to the different types of machines 
produced in large factories or workshops. The Istisna contract is also 
applied in the construction industry for apartment buildings, hospitals, 
schools, and universities. 
Difference between Istisna and Salam: 
1. The subject of Istisna is always a thing that needs 
manufacturing, while Salam can be effected on anything, no matter 
whether it needs manufacturing or not. 
2. It is necessary for Salam that the price is paid in advance, while 
it is not necessary in Istisna. 
3. The contract of Salam, once effected, cannot be cancelled 
unilaterally, while the contract of Istisna can be cancelled before the 
manufacturer starts the work. 
4. The time of delivery is an essential part of the sale in Salam while 
it is not necessary in Istisna that the time of the delivery be fixed. 
5. The buyer may stipulate in the Istisna  contract that the commodity 
shall be manufactured or produced by a specific manufacturer, or 
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manufactured from specific materials. This is not permitted in the case 
of Salam sale. 
Difference Between Istisna and Ijarah : 
It should also be kept in mind that the manufacturer, in Istisna, 
undertakes to make the required goods with his own material. 
Therefore, this transaction implies that the manufacturer shall obtain 
the material, if it is not already with him, and shall undertake the work 
required for making the ordered goods with it. 
However, if the customer provides the material, and the 
manufacturer is required to use his labor and skill only, the 
transaction is not Istisna. In this case it will be a transaction of Ijarah 
whereby the services of a person are retained for a specified fee 
paid to him. 
 
 
D. Islamic bonds (Sukuk) : 
 
Muslim jurists subject the buying and selling of debt obligations to 
certain conditions in order to comply with the prohibition of riba 
(interest), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). specify these 
conditions in detail. In summary, the debt must be a genuine one i.e., it 
must not be a subterfuge to borrow money such as an asset-linked 
buy-back arrangement. The debtor must acknowledge the trade and 
creditors must be known, accessible, and sound. Trading must be on 
a spot basis and not against debt. Importantly, the price cannot be other 
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than the face value. In line with these principles, early doctrine on 
interest-free finance disallowed corporate or government bonds and 
the discounting of bills. Pressures for innovation have resulted in 
finding a way out of these limitations, admitting ‘financial 
engineering’. In particular, leasing-based bonds (sukuk al-ijara) have 
been developed. Although other sukuk have been issued, eg sukuk al-
mudaraba, sukuk al-musharaka, sukuk al- murabaha, the ijara sukuk 
remains the most popular.(, 2008 ) 
Sukuk means participation certificate, and is commonly referred to as 
an ‘Islamic bond’. Techniques similar to conventional structured 
finance securities are employed, with sukuk akin to pass-through 
certificates. A sakk simply represents a proportional or undivided 
ownership interest in an asset or pool of assets . Islamic bonds are 
more useful if they can be traded 
on the secondary market to gain liquidity. As indicated above,certain 
requirements must be met with respect to the trading capacity of the 
bonds on the Islamic financial market. Specifically, they cannot 
represent a debt (in Islam, debt-selling is forbidden), as conventional 
bonds can. Instead they must constitute property of an approved asset. 
Such a bond is obtained through the securitization of the asset, the 
property of which is divided into equally valued units and incorporated 
in the sukuk certificates. The value of the sukuk thus remains 
connected to the value of the underlying asset. While they come in zero 
coupon and coupon versions, the productivity and return is linked to 
the profit of the underlying asset and not to an interest rate (although 
54  
  
an interest rate such as LIBOR can be used as a ‘benchmark’). 
Consider, for example, the case of the sukuk al-ijara. The originator 
holds assets (land, buildings, aircraft, ships, etc) that are to constitute 
the basis of the returns to the sukuk investor. These assets are sold 
by the originator to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and then are 
leased back at a specified rental. The SPV securitizes the assets by 
issuing sukuk certificates that can be purchased by investors. Each 
sukukIn what ways does Islamic banking differ from conventional 
finance? 
certificate represents a share in the ownership of the assets, entitling 
the investor to periodic distributions from the SPV funded by the 
originator’s rental payments on the leased assets. 
The  returns  can  be  either  fixed  rate  or  floating  rate  (often referenced 
to LIBOR as a ‘benchmark’) depending on the originator. 
So far, AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions) has issued Standards for fourteen types 
of sukuk .These can be broadly grouped into sukuk that bear 
predetermined returns and sukuk that allow for sharing of profit and, 
in some instances, loss. Sukuk al-murabaha and sukuk al-murabaha 
are examples of profit-and-loss-sharing sukuk. To date, most issued 
sukuk have borne predetermined returns, and the majority of such sukuk 
have been sukuk al-ijara, frequently at a predetermined rate of return. 
In fact, the basic structure of a sukuk is very flexible and can be varied 
in a number of ways. The underlying assets that are pooled and 
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securitized can be ijara, murabaha, istisnaa or musharaka receivables, 
or combinations of them, and the rates of return can be fixed, floating 
or zero coupon. Investment risks (credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange risk, market price risk, liquidity risk) are much the same as 
those of conventional bonds, and depend on the way the securitization 
is structured, although one unique risk is that of shari’a compliance, 
a factor which also governs the tradeability of the sukuk. 
Indeed, it is the potential for tradeability that primarily makes for the 
popularity of sukuk al-ijara. Ijara, though less commonly employed 
than murabaha as an asset in Islamic banks’ balance sheets offers much 
greater flexibility for the Islamic bond market. Each security called 
sukuk-al-ijara represents a pro rata ownership of physical assets as 
against a pro rata share in financial claims or debt in the case of sukuk-
al-murabaha. While debt can only be transferred at par, ownership in 
physical assets can always be transferred at a mutually negotiated price. 
Hence sukuk-al-ijara allow for creation of a secondary market since 
they represent a share in the ownership of a physical asset. 
In 2010 Sukuk issuances hit a record of US$47.78 billion if 
compared to the last five years; managing to surpass 2007 peak level by 
around 7% and 50% if compared to 2009. If this was to convey 
something, it would be the increasing confidence the global markets 
are regaining. According to Dow Jones Islamic Markets Indices 
December Commentary, the DJIM Citigroup Sukuk Index gained 
9.1% in 2010 finishing at 125.32 points. 
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As at end-2012, the value of outstanding global sukuk topped USD 
229.4 billion – a record high helped by new issuances worth USD 
131.2 billion. Malaysia, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 
feature among the countries that have been at the forefront of growth 
in the sukuk primary market. Third quarter of 2012 saw the debut of the 
first Islamic Basel III compliant Tier I structure, closely followed in 
first quarter of 2013 by another Islamic bank, both from the UAE, 
successfully raising US$1b each. 
Finally, Islam has laid down a number of conditions to ensure that 
credit expands in step with the growth of the real rector. Some of 
these conditions are: 
1. The asset which is being sold or leased must be real, and not 
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imaginary or notional; 
2. The seller must own and possess the goods being sold or leased; 
3. The transaction must be a genuine trade transaction with the full 
intention of giving and taking delivery; and 
4. The debt cannot be sold and thus the risk of default associated 
with it must be borne by the lender himself. 
The first condition will help eliminate most of the speculative and 
gambling transactions which involve notional goods and which 
constituted a major part of the derivatives transactions during the 
current crisis. The second condition will help ensure that the seller (or 
lessor) also shares a part of the risk to be able to get a share in the 
return. Once the seller (financier) acquires ownership and possession 
of the goods for sale or lease, he/she bears the risk. This condition will 
put a constraint on short sales, and thereby remove the possibility of 
a steep decline in asset prices during a downturn. The Shari'ah has, 
however, made an exception to this rule in the case of salam and istisna 
where the goods are not already available in the market and need to 
be produced or manufactured before delivery. This will help ensure that 
financing expands in step with the rise of the real economy and thereby 
help curb excessive credit expansion. 
The third and the fourth conditions will not only help eliminate a great 
deal of speculative and derivatives transactions where there is no 
intention of giving or taking delivery, but also motivate the creditor to 
be more cautious in evaluating the credit risk. This will prevent an 
unnecessary explosion in the volume and value of transactions and also 
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help keep the rise in debt to be in step with the rise of the real 
economy. It will also release a greater volume of financial resources 
for the real sector and, thereby, help expand employment and self-
employment opportunities and the production of need-fulfilling goods 
and services. 
The discipline that Islam wishes to introduce in the financial system 
may not materialize unless the governments reduce their borrowing 
from the central bank to a level that is in harmony with the goal of price 
and financial stability. Even borrowing from the private sector should 
be primarily for development that will increase its ability to repay. 
Borrowing for meeting current spending needs to be avoided except in 
extreme circumstances. This is because borrowing does not eliminate 
the ultimate need for sacrifice. 
Without this consciousness about the ultimate need for sacrifice, the 
need for borrowing is most likely to become path dependent .A number 
of objections may be raised here against these conditions. One of these 
is that hedging is a genuine need of the economy and the restrictions 
specified above may stand against it. Genuine hedging or insurance 
which is undertaken by a person or firm to provide  protection 
against losses actually incurred has been recognized by Muslim jurists. 
However, what is prohibited is ‘hedging’ that is not related to a real 
transaction and is rather of a speculative and gambling nature. A 
second objection may be that all these conditions will tend to shrink 
the size of the economy by reducing the number and volume of 
derivatives transactions. There is not doubt that the number of 
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transactions will be reduced. However, it will be primarily those 
transactions which are of a speculative and gambling nature and are 
generally recognized to be zero-sum games. These have rarely 
contributed significantly to total real output. The compounded annual 
rate of growth of total outstanding derivatives between 2000 and 
2007 was 29.9 percent per annum while that in total real world output 
was only 3.1 percent per annum. Hence a decline in speculative and 
gambling transactions is not likely to hurt the real economy 
significantly. While a restriction on such transactions will cut the 
commissions earned by speculators during an artificially generated 
boom, it will help them avert losses and bankruptcy that become 
unavoidable during the decline and lead to a financial crisis. 
 
 
E.  ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
 
The emergence of Islamic banking in recent years is one of the most 
important trends in the economic sector, and with the estimated 
1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, it’s ripe for growth potential. 
There has always been a demand among Muslims for financial 
products and services that conform to Shari'ah(Islamic Law). The 
development of viable alternatives to conventional finance 
increasingly enables Muslims to participate in the financial world 
without violating their Islamic principles and without bearing the 
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economic penalty that comes from non-participation, especially with 
the recent growth of oil prices. 
Currently, the Islamic banking industry consists of several hundred 
billion dollars, and more than 300 financial institutions in and outside 
the Muslim world. There is $300 billion in assets managed according 
to Islamic principles, ranging from commercial to investment banks 
and investment funds, all providing Islamic products.1 
Others estimate the industry to be even larger. Financial Services 
Authority, the financial services regulator in the United Kingdom, for 
example, recently suggested Islamic banking was as large as $500 
billion. Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, estimates that the sukuk 
(deed) market has reached $70 billion, and will top the $160 billion 
mark by the end of the decade.(Al-Rifaee 2008) 
 
Islamic financial services are now evolving from a niche market to the 
mainstream. 
In addition to the sheer number of Muslims worldwide, global 
financial institutions are taking a strong interest in Islamic products 
since the industry is in its nascent stage. Products have yet to be 
commoditized from competition, therefore allowing profit margins 
to remain high. 
What is Islamic banking? 
Islamic banking can be considered banking with a conscience. 
1 Sarah s. Al-Rifaee ,Islamic banking myths and facts.at:www.arabinsight.org 
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Islamic banks each have a  Shari'ah board made up of  Shari'ah 
scholars as well as financial experts who are responsible for 
determining what activities are and are not Shari'ah-compliant. 
Islamic banking is based on two main financial principles. Firstly, 
investment is to be made in the private sector through interest- free
 financing. Secondly, the development of financial 
instruments is to be done on the basis of profit and loss sharing as 
well as sharing risks. 
Further, Islamic banking is built around Shari'ah, mainly prohibiting 
the charging of interest. Because Islam considers interest an 
unjustified increase of capital, with no effort made to earn it, it is 
considered of false value, and therefore is prohibited. However, there 
are many arguments about the prohibition of interest in Islam. The 
first argument is that interest rates have no moral foundation. The 
second is that abstinence from consumption is not a justification of 
rewards.(Al-Rifaee 2008) 
Lastly, some argue that there are risks to justify the supplement of 
payment for capital lending if the loan is guaranteed. 
In addition to the prohibition of interest payments, Islamic law treats 
money strictly as a medium of exchange. In other words, money, in 
itself, does not have any inherent value, and therefore it should not lead 
to the production of more money. In Islamic banking, the 
creditor/debtor relationship is defined differently than in the secular 
financial world. The creditor, or provider, of funds who becomes a 
partner in a project assumes the risk activity with the entrepreneur 
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and shares profits as well as losses. 
The creation of incremental wealth justifies the share of profit 
between the borrower and the lender of money, but does not 
guarantee a fixed return. 
Some of the principle instruments involved in the aforementioned 
form of resource mobilization include the following: 
Trade financing and cost-plus mark-up on traded goods (murabaha). 
Profit-sharing (mudarabah) and equity participation (musharaka) in 
which cost-sharing among partners is also included. 
Rental on purchased equipment (ijara). 
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Islamic banking portfolio using secondary financing instruments, 
 
The following are the main differential points between conventional 
banking and Islamic banking.(AHMAD, 1998 ) 
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 Source: AL-RIFAEE, S. S. Islamic banking myths and facts. 2008. 
 
In particular, Islamic banks are already serving 38 million 
customers globally, two-thirds of who reside in seven countries, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Indonesia, and 
Turkey. One-fifth of the banking system assets across these 
countries have now transitioned to Islamic. In Saudi Arabia, 
supply push has seen share of Islamic banking cross 50percent of 
system assets.The global market for Islamic financial services, as 
measured by Shari'ah compliant assets, is estimated by TheCityUK 
to have increased in 2013, to a record $1,688bn.((UKIFS) 2013) 
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 The industry is set to grow significantly in the years ahead. At the 
current rate of growth the market could top $2 trillion in assets by 
the end of 2014. The largest centres remain concentrated in Malaysia 
and the Middle East, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
Kuwait. 
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Islamic finance has shown resilience at a time when the global 
economy has  slowed  and  conventional  banking  in  Western 
countries has been under pressure. Global assets of Islamic 
finance have doubled since the start of the economic slowdown. 
Considerable potential exists for expansion of Islamic finance. The 
Muslim population numbering some 1.6 billion accounts for nearly 
a quarter of the global population, but Sharia compliant assets make 
up only around 1percent of the world’s financial assets. Less than 
a fifth of Muslims worldwide currently use Islamic financial 
products. The extent of the industry’s penetration varies 
substantially .There are over 700 institutions registered globally 
as sharia- compliant organisations in financial services. Of these, 
around 500 are full-fledged standalone institutions, and the 
remainder operate sharia-compliant products within a conventional 
institution or known as Islamic windows. Countries with most of 
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the 430 firms reporting to The Banker’s survey include Bahrain and 
Indonesia with 74 and 71 firms respectively. Malaysia, Iran, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia were in a group of countries with more than 50 
firms.((UKIFS) 2013) 
 
F. Leading organizations of Islamic finance 
In the beginning the industry focused all its attention on retail, which 
was followed by commercial banking activities. The next step, capital 
market activities, took a bit longer time to be developed, but it began to 
boom in a very short time and this boom attracted more and more actors 
into this business, especially western countries in the mid 1990s. As the 
Islamic finance industry attracted more and more countries and the 
public interest grew all over the world, central banks and regulatory 
authorities in these countries began to call for regulations and 
supervision of the Islamic finance industry. Another additional problem 
that followed the boom in IFIs was the difference in products available 
by these institutions. IFIs in the beginning of 1970s began increasingly 
to consult experts in Islamic law in order to be sure if their product were 
adherent to Shari‘a. However, there was need for a standard setting so 
the products at least could be of same content, if not the same name. 
All these problems led to the establishment of Shari'ah boards within 
the IFIs. But this was not enough because the inconsistencies in 
interpretations of different Shari'ah boards in IFIs led to the fact that 
some transactions were Shari'ah compliant in the rules of one board and 
not compliant with Shari'ah in the rules of other board. Therefore, 
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international standard setting organs such as Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), Islamic International Rating Agency 
(IIRA), and International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) were found 
to facilitate, by issuing international standards and guidelines, the 
homogeneous interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence and dealing with 
corporate governance issues. Recently the International Islamic 
Liquidity Management Corp (IILM) has been established to assist 
institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing their 
liquidity management issues in an efficient and effective manner. These 
main bodies of Islamic finance are explained in detail in the following 
subchapters. (Faiz 2011) 
1. Shari'ah Boards 
It should be stressed that Shari'ah board is not a standard setting body 
in itself, but assist other regulatory and standard setting organizations 
in establishing and maintaining a good governance practice among 
IFIs. Shari'ah board is a committee of Islamic scholars whose job is to 
verify if the new products presented by IFIs comply with Shari‘a. These 
scholars’ functions are similar to members of boards in conventional 
corporations, i.e. they are not employed be IFIs but receive honoraria, 
and they have the right to be members of Shari'ah boards in different 
IFIs simultaneously. The latter is because there are few dozen countable 
Shari'ah scholars who are familiar with both Islamic law and modern 
financial needs in the world. Although the numbers of such scholars are 
growing, they still lag behind the growth of the industry need.  The first 
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ever Shari'ah board was established by Egypt’s Faisal Islamic Bank in 
1976 and soon other IFIs followed this example. Today Shari'ah boards 
of IFIs are required by law in majority of Islamic countries, and even if 
it is not required by law, Shari'ah boards have become an important part 
of IFIs. However, lately Shari'ah boards have been criticized by many 
economists for being a part of corporate governance or agency theory 
problems in IFIs because of conflict of interests. To tackle these kinds 
of problems Malaysia as the first country in the world has regulated 
scholars to be member of the Shari'ah board of maximum three IFIs 
simultaneously. AAOIFI standards have defined Shari'ah boards’ duty 
as directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the IFIs in order 
to ensure that they are in compliance with Shari'ah principles. AAOIFI 
standards have also made it mandatory for all IFIs to elect their Shari'ah 
board members through the shareholders annual general meeting upon 
the recommendation of the board of directors, taking into consideration 
local legislation and regulations. Furthermore it states that these 
members should not be chosen among directors and majority 
shareholders of the IFI. Maintaining and formalizing the internal 
regulatory role of Shari'ah boards is considered vital as these internal 
bodies are best placed to assist their individual organizations in 
achieving Shari'ah compliance, and thus play an important role in the 
overall regulatory environment.  
2. AAOIFI 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) is an Islamic international autonomous non-
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profit making corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics and Shari'ah standards for Islamic financial 
institutions. It was established in accordance with the Agreement of 
Association which was signed by Islamic financial institutions on 26 
February 1990 in Algiers. The AAOIFI has a two-tiered organizational 
structure in order to separate the standard-setting function from 
financing the organization, so that the standard setters are not subject 
to a conflict of interest.  IFIs are not obliged to adapt AAOIFIs 
standards and guidelines. However, regulatory and supervisory 
authorities around the world are increasingly relying upon them and 
align their standards according to it. For example many Shari'ah boards 
consist of at least three scholars who have a comprehensive financial 
expertise and education in legal questions according to AAOIFI 
standards. The AAOIFI provides guidelines for IFIs when/if they face 
difficulties in interpretations, or understanding of issues related to new 
financial products. So far the AAOIFI has issued 25 standards in 
accounting, 5 in auditing, 7 in corporate governance and 2 codes of 
ethics. The AAOIFI is focusing on the auditing and accounting side, 
where processes and transactions need to be handled differently from 
conventional banking practice.   
3. IFSB 
To ensure the sound and stable development of the Islamic financial 
industry, it needs to be supported by a strong regulatory and 
supervisory framework. To fulfill this requirement, the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established in 2002. The IFSB is 
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an international body hosted by Malaysia. It has the important mandate 
of developing the prudential standards in accordance with the unique 
features of the Islamic financial institution.  IFSB was established under 
the sponsorship of the International Monetary Fund, and in close 
cooperation with IMF and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
has become one of the most influential international organizations that 
promote Islamic finance and its standards. IFSB tries to adapt the 
existing standards and guidelines of the mentioned organizations and 
adjusts them in accordance with the Shari'ah principles to IFIs. The 
IFSB's focus is very much on the standardization of procedures and the 
way Shari'ah rulings are interpreted across the industry.  Since its 
establishment the IFSB has issued 17 standards, guiding principles and 
technical notes in the areas of risk management, corporate governance, 
transparency and market discipline, and etc. IFSB is closely 
cooperating with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
International Organization for Securities Commissions and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors. 
4. IIRA 
The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) started operations in 
July 2005 to facilitate development of the regional and national 
financial markets by delineating relative investment or credit risk, 
providing an assessment of the risk profile of entities and instruments. 
This should be an integral part of the decision process employed by 
institutional investors. IIRA assists the Islamic financial services 
industry to gain recognition locally and internationally as strong and 
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capable financial institutions, adhering to greater standards of 
disclosure and transparency. Its mission is to support the development 
of the regional capital market and to improve its functioning.  IIRA has 
become an alternative to the international rating agencies and it aims to 
become a reference on which investors and financiers can rely to 
achieve “Quality” in terms of compliance with the related Shari'ah rules 
and principles for Islamic financial services. IIRA is a profit making 
body and it works like its conventional counterparts, charging a set fee 
per piece of work.  
5. IIFM 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) is the global 
standardization body for the Islamic Capital & Money Market segment 
of the IFIs. Its primary focus lies in the standardization of Islamic 
financial products, documentation and related processes.  
The Agreement to establish the IIFM was signed in November 2001 by 
the Governors of the Central banks /Monetary Agencies Malaysia, 
Bahrain, Indonesia, Sudan, and the President of the Islamic 
Development Bank. It began its operation in 2002. Its main objectives 
are: 
1. To spur the establishment and development of an 
international financial market based on Shari'ah rules and 
principles 
2. Addressing the issue of liquidity management in IFIs 
3. Developing an active secondary market, and  
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4. Creating the environment that will encourage both Islamic 
and non-Islamic financial institutions to actively 
participate in a secondary market and the information of 
new traceable instructions. 
IIFM will also act as the focal point for the harmonization of Shari'ah 
interpretations in the global financial market and enhance the 
cooperative framework among IFIs globally. In September 2006 the 
IIFM signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), with an eye to developing 
a master agreement for documenting privately negotiated Shari‘a-
compliant derivatives transactions. In march 2010 the ISDA/IIFM 
Tahawwut master agreement was launched. It is a completely new 
framework document though the structure of the document is similar to 
the conventional ISDA Master Agreement. However, the key 
mechanisms and provisioning such as early termination events, 
closeout and netting are developed based on the Islamic Shari’ah 
principles. 
6. IILM 
The International Islamic Liquidity Management Corp (IILM) is a 
collaborative effort by 11 central banks or monetary agencies from 
countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Luxembourg and the 
United Arab Emirates, as well as two multilateral organizations to assist 
institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing their 
liquidity management. The IILM has been established to assist 
institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing their 
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liquidity management issues in an efficient and effective manner. This 
institution addresses one of the fundamental problems of Islamic 
financial institutions: the provision of adequate liquidity in times of 
stress. The IILM is expected to issue high quality, triple A-rated liquid, 
tradable and low risk Shari‘a-compliant financial instruments at both 
the national level and across borders, to enhance the soundness and 
stability of the Islamic financial markets. The instruments of the IILM 
will be utilized in liquidity management as eligible collateral for 
interbank transactions and central bank financing, or through trading of 
IILM instruments (either within the same country or cross border) in 
the secondary market. As the IILM is intended to facilitate cross-border 
liquidity management, its instruments shall be denominated in major 
reserve currencies such as the US dollar and the euro. This is to ensure 
access to a large pool of global investors and broaden the range of its 
holders, thereby enhancing the prospects for active secondary market. 
If the assets can be traded through the IILM, then much fewer of these 
assets will be held by the institutions. 
 
III. Corporate governance in Islamic Finance: basic concepts 
and issues 
 
If Islamic financial institutions are to be credible to their clients, they 
need to have a formalised system to ensure that all their activities are 
Shari'ah compliant. Exactly what constitutes an effective Shari'ah 
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governance system is a matter of debate, however, and it is apparent 
from examining the experiences of different countries and institutions 
that a variety of systems are in place. This pluralistic approach has 
advantages, as the legal environments in which Islamic financial 
institutions operate differ, not only in terms of the status of Shari'ah, 
but also depending on whether the countries use common or civil law. 
Furthermore, client expectations of what constitutes acceptable and 
effective Shari'ah governance differ, and, as will be evident from this 
study, most systems currently employed are market rather than state 
driven. Indeed, in the realm of Islamic finance, Shari'ah governance has 
largely been privatised rather than nationalised.The credibility of 
financial institutions with their clients has been highlighted by the 
financial crisis of 2008, when some conventional financial institutions 
faced a run on deposits. Many conventional financial institutions found 
that they had lost the confidence of other banks and, hence, they could 
no longer rely on the inter-bank market for funding. Merely having a 
Shari'ah Board does not, of course, provide immunity to liquidity crises 
or overcome the difficulties associated with the credit crunch, but it was 
noticeable that in many jurisdictions Islamic banks fared better than 
their conventional counterparts. (Wilson, 2009 ) 
This was because of two factors that were positively linked to Shari'ah 
governance. Firstly, Islamic banks have to rely on depositors rather 
than inter-bank borrowing for their funding, which immunized them 
from the credit crunch. However, their ability to continue to harness 
these funds depends on the depositor’s perceptions of the integrity of 
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the Shari'ah governance system. Secondly, Islamic banks could not 
hold assets that would ultimately prove toxic–for instance, credit 
derivative swaps or collateralised debt obligations–as such assets are 
not Shari'ah compliant, and their acquisition would not have been 
approved by any Shari'ah Board. 
In other words, although the management of credit, liquidity, 
operational and other risks is the responsibility of the Board of 
Directors of an Islamic bank and not the Shari'ah Board, good Shari'ah 
governance prevents financial institutions from damaging themselves. 
In essence, this financial crisis, like others before it, was caused by 
human greed and uncontrolled excesses. Such behavior has no place in 
Islamic finance, and it is effective Shari'ah governance that promotes 
moderation and justice in financial transactions. 
 
A. Definition of corporate governance 
 
 
The agency problem arises because of the relationship between the 
owners and the management. The scandal in corporate 
governance made the scholars defining corporate governance based 
on the problem solving perspective or corporate affairs perspective. 
In addition, most definition states that internal governance 
mechanism involves board of directors and ownership structure 
while external involves to take over market and legal system. 
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The governments of the 30 OECD countries have approved a 
revised version of the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance 
adding new recommendations for good practice in corporate 
behaviour with a view to rebuilding and maintaining public     trust     
in     companies     and     stock      markets. 
 
The revised Principles respond to a number of issues that have 
undermined the confidence of investors in company management in 
recent years. They call  on  governments to ensure genuinely 
effective regulatory frameworks and on companies themselves to 
be truly accountable. They advocate an increased awareness among 
institutional investors and an effective role for shareholders in 
executive compensation. They also urge strengthened transparency 
and disclosure to counter conflicts of interest. 
 
Corporate governance aims at providing institutions with a body of 
rules and principles, with a view to ensuring that good practices 
guide overall management of an institution. It has now come to mean 
the whole process of managing a company and the incentive 
structure to address principal-agent issues and ensure that 
executive management serves the long-term best interests of the 
shareholders and sustainable value of the company in conformity 
with the laws and ethics of the country. All of the complex factors 
that are involved in balancing the power between the Chief 
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Executive Officer (CEO), the board, and the shareholders are now 
considered to be a part of the corporate governance framework, 
including auditing, balance sheet and off-balance disclosure, and 
transparency. 
Hence, corporate governance refers to the method by which a 
corporation is directed, administered and controlled. It includes the 
laws and customs affecting that direction, as well as the goals for 
which it is governed. Corporate governance mechanisms, incentives 
and controls are designed to reduce the inefficiencies that arise from 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Corporate governance is also 
viewed as a process of monitoring performance by applying 
appropriate counter- measures and dealing with transparency, 
integrity and accountability. It organizes the way corporations are 
accountable to shareholders and the public, and also the monitoring 
of the executive management of organisations in running their
 businesses. 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 
1999, have been widely adopted as a benchmark both in OECD 
countries and elsewhere. They are used as one of 12 key standards by 
the Financial Stability Forum for ensuring international financial 
stability and by the World Bank in its work to   improve   corporate   
governance   in   emerging   markets. 
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In 2002, OECD governments called for a review of the Principles to 
take account of developments in the corporate sector. The revised 
text is the product of a consultation process involving 
representatives of both OECD and non-OECD governments as well 
as of businesses and professional bodies, trade unions, civil society 
organisations and international standard-setting bodies. The OECD 
began a review of the principles in 2003 considering the recent 
changes and developments and after an extensive review the 
process led to adopt revised and reviewed OECD principles of 
corporate governance in April, 2004. The revision principles not 
only reflect the experience of OECD countries but also the emerging 
and developing economics. The revised principles are non-binding 
in nature and it lays up to the governments and market participants 
to decide for their own framework. It also confirmed the adaptability 
of the principles as a reference in varying legal, economic and 
cultural contexts. “Corporate governance is the system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled . The corporate 
governance specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the 
rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. 
By doing this, it also provides the structures through which the 
company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance”. The following are the 
main areas of the OECD principles and its annotation:(Abu-
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Tapanjeh 2009) 
Principle 1: Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate 
governance framework. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework  should promote 
transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of 
law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among 
different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
Principle 2: The right of shareholders and key ownership functions. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
Principle 3: The equitable treatment of shareholders. Annotation:
 The corporate governance framework
 should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunities to obtain effective 
redress for violation of their rights. 
Principle 4: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework
 should recognize  the  rights  of  stakeholders  
established  by  lawor through mutual agreements and encourage 
active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
Principle 5: Disclosure and transparency. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework  should ensure 
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that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters 
regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company. 
Principle 6: The responsibilities of the board. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework  should ensure 
the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring 
of management by the board, and board’s accountability to the 
company and the shareholders. 
The main theme of the above principle lies in four basic principles. 
Firstly, the mechanism of business ethics, secondly the mechanism 
of decision making, thirdly in adequate disclosure and transparency 
and lastly the mechanism of book keeping and final accounts. 
These OECD principles are so sound that even the non-members 
of OECD are implementing and adopting. 
The soundness of these  principles has been  proved by its adoption 
all over the world the next section will discuss the Islamic view 
of corporate government from the Islamic perspective. 
 
Researchers have defined corporate governance in a variety of ways, 
and the most widely cited definitions follow. The OECD defines 
CG as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
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and monitoring performance are determined”. (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004) 
 
This definition provides important attributes of CG and emphasizes 
transparency. However, it does not directly deal with the intrinsic 
issue of the business objectives that should guide the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities within the corporation. Indeed, the 
objectives of a corporation’s founders’, whether these be the 
increase of shareholders’ value or the pursuit of stakeholders’ interest, 
can be expected to affect such a distribution and shape the 
institutional structure and systems. In particular,the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among shareholders and other 
stakeholders would be driven by the interests of whoever 
establishes the corporation and subsequently controls it. 
 
The revised Principles emphasise the importance of a regulatory 
framework in corporate governance that promotes efficient markets, 
facilitates effective enforcement and clearly defines the 
responsibilities between different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. They also emphasise the need to ensure 
transparent lines of management responsibility within companies 
so as to make boards and management truly accountable. 
Other  issues  addressed  by  the  revised  Principles  include: 
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Institutional investors 
• They should disclose their corporate governance policies, how 
they decide on the use of their voting rights and how they 
manage conflicts of interest that may compromise their 
voting; 
• Restrictions on consultations between shareholders about their 
voting intentions should be eased to reduce the cost of 
informed ownership. 
 
Shareholder rights 
• The rights of investors must be strengthened. Shareholders 
should be able to remove board members and participate 
effectively in the nomination and election processes; 
• They should be able to make their views known about 
executive and board remuneration policy and any equity 
component should be subject to their approval. 
 
Conflicts of interest and auditor responsibility 
• A new principle calls for rating agencies and analysts to 
avoid conflicts of interest which could compromise their 
advice; 
• The duties of the auditor must be strengthened and include 
accountability to shareholders and a duty to the company to 
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exercise due professional care when conducting an audit; 
• Auditors should be wholly independent and not be 
compromised by other relations with the company. 
 
Stakeholder rights and whistle-blower protection 
• The Principles make reference to the rights of stakeholders, 
whether established by law or through mutual agreements. 
• A new principle advocates protection for whistleblowers, 
including institutions through which their complaints or 
allegations can be addressed and provides for confidential 
access to a board member. 
 
Board responsibilities 
• The duties and responsibilities of the board have been 
clarified as fiduciary in nature, particularly important where 
company groups are concerned; 
• The principle covering board independence and objectivity has 
been extended to avoid conflicts of interest and to cover 
situations characterised by block and controlling 
shareholders, as well as the board's responsibility for 
oversight of internal control systems covering financial 
reporting. 
A concept of corporate governance from Islamic perspective does 
not differ much with the conventional definition as it refers to a 
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system by which companies are directed and controlled with a 
purpose to meet the corporation’s objective by protecting all the 
stakeholders’ interest and right. Uniquely, in the context of 
corporate governance within the Islamic paradigm it presents 
distinct  characteristics  and  features  in  comparison  with  the 
conventional system as it refers as a special case of a broader 
decision-making theory that uses the premise of Islamic socio- 
scientific epistemology which is premised on the divine oneness of 
God . A definition by the finance committee on corporate 
governance in Malaysia in the report on corporate governance 
stated that: 
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct 
and manage the business and affairs of the company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the 
ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholder value, whilst 
taking account the interests of other stakeholders. 
This indicates that corporate governance is not only applied to the 
shareholders but the other stakeholders as well. 
Corporate governance in Islamic finance necessitates Islamic 
financial institutions abiding by a set of rules called the Islamic law 
or Shari’a. The Shari’a governs the bank’s operations and 
transactions in accordance with Islamic principles derived from the 
Quran and Hadith. 
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Regulatory and Corporate Governance (CG) framework of Banks 
I. National CG Framework 
- Banking Sector Specific Laws/Codes/Guidelines 
- Stock Exchanges Listing Rules and Regulations 
- Listed Companies Regulatory Authorities Laws, Rules and 
Regulations 
II. Islamic Finance and Shari’a specific Codes & Standards 
- IFSB  Guiding  Principles  on  Shari’a  Governance  systems  for  
Institutions  Offering  Islamic Financial Services 2009 
- IFSB Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business for 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services 2009 
- IFSB Guiding Principles On Corporate Governance For 
Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions And Islamic Mutual Funds) 
2006 
- IFSB Guidance on Key Elements in the Supervisory Review 
Process of Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services 
(excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic 
Mutual Funds) 2007 
- AAOIFI Accounting, Auditing & Governance Standards (for Islamic 
financial institutions) 
 
 
III. International Standards and Codes 
- The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
- Guidance by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on 
Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations 2006 
 
 
The above framework suggests the build-up of a corporate 
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governance framework for IFIs. To ensure that a national 
or sector specific CG framework is consistent with 
international best practice, the framework should incorporate 
the OECD principles and the BIS Guidelines. 
Comparison of  Islamic Corporate Governance Principles with 
OECD principles 
 
An attempt is made to bring a comparative position of Islamic 
principles of corporate governance with the revised principles 
of OECD.(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009) 
 
Principle number OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
 
Insuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
• Promotion of transparent 
and 
1 efficient markets with rule 
of law and division of 
responsibilities 
• Promotion of business within 
ethical framework of 
Shari‘a 
• Believes in profit and loss 
• Primacy of Justice and social 
welfare with social and spiritual 
obligations 
• Prohibition of interest 
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Principle number OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
 
The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
• Basic shareholder rights • Property as trust from God 
2 • Participation in Decision- 
making at the general 
meetings 
• Structures and arrangements 
markets for corporate control 
• Ownership rights by all 
shareholders including 
institutional shareholders 
• Consultative process 
between shareholders 
and institutional 
shareholders 
The equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
• Protection to minority and 
foreign 
shareholders 
• Sole Authority is God 
 
 
• Society as stakeholders 
 
 
• Accountability not only to 
stakeholders but also to God, the 
ultimate owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Just and fairness of value 
 
 
• Equitable distribution of wealth 
to all stakeholders and 
disadvantages members in the 
form of Zakat and Sadqa 
3 
• Social and individual welfare 
with both spiritual and moral 
obligation 
• Sensation of Equality 
 
The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
• In creating wealth, jobs 
and 
sustainability of 
4 
financially sound 
enterprises Disclosure and 
transparency 
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• Islamic accountability to Falah and 
social welfare orientation 
 
 
• Haram/Halal dichotomy in transaction 
• Social & individual welfare 
from both spiritual and 
material 
• Consideration to whole community. 
• Matters regarding corporation • Accountability with Shari'ahcompliance 
• Financial situation • Socio-economic objectives 
5 
related to  firms’ control and 
accountabilitytoallits 
stakeholders 
• Performance, 
ownership and 
governance 
 
 
 
The responsibilities of the 
board 
• Justice, equality, truthfulness 
transparency 
 
• Wider accountability with 
written as well as oral disclosure 
 
• Strategic guidance • Accountability not only to company or 
board or stakeholders but also to Allah 
6 
the 
ultimate authority who leads to 
welfare and success 
• Monitoring of management • Holistic and integrative guidance 
• Accountability to 
company and 
stakeholders 
• Negotiation and co-operation 
 
 
• Consultation and consensus 
seeking for each decision with 
related stakeholders 
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B. Corporate governance system around the world 
1. Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system 
The Anglo-Saxon system is taking by the main source of firm’s finance. 
Therefore, the main concentration of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance is 
the shareholder interest where the principle is applied by given the right to each 
shareholder to vote pursuant to that the law found to be protecting the  
shareholder  against the  management where a shareholder can be found 
misusing the company money which might affect the shareholder  wealth. 
The composition of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system is one 
board of directors constituting of executives and non-executives. The 
executive directors are managers of the corporations; whereas the non-executive 
directors are representing the shareholders to monitor the manager in their day to 
day business. Both executive and non-executives directors’ members are 
appointed and dismissed by general assembly of shareholders . (Alnasser and 
Muhammed 2012) 
 
2. Germanic corporate governance system 
The Germanic corporate governance system deals with the firm as an 
autonomous economic entity which may benefit to shareholders and 
stakeholders in the firm. Countries which implement this system use two board 
system consisting of a supervisory board and managing board. Supervisory 
board main duties are to appoint the managing dismiss managing board and 
to evaluate management performance. Germanic corporate governance system 
considers the bank as the main source of finance. Therefore, the bank  
has a significant voting right in shareholder’s assembly and also represents 
shareholders’ interest in a supervisory board. (Alnasser and Muhammed 2012) 
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3. Latin corporate governance system 
The Latin corporate governance system is considered more flexible 
compared with previous systems. In a context of board of directors, Latin 
corporations have an option to select either one board as Anglo-Saxon system 
or two boards as in Germanic system, shareholders have more influence in the 
Latin system, i.e. in French legislation, shareholders can remove a director, 
which overrule on a share one vote system. (Alnasser and Muhammed 2012) 
 
4. Japanese corporate governance system 
The board of directors in Japanese system comprises a board of directors, an 
office of representative directors and an office of auditors. The president is the 
rarely the chairman of the board. Banks have high influence on the decision 
making of the management in the Japanese system. (Alnasser and Muhammed 
2012) 
 
C. Shari'ah Governance in Islamic Finance 
Islamic financial institutions have the duty to ensure the compliance with 
Shari'ah principles in all aspects of their products, instruments, operations, 
practices and management which will be achieved by the establishment of a 
proper Shari'ah governance framework. Thus Shari'ah supervision plays an 
essential role in the governance of Islamic financial institution and forms part 
of the principal component of the Shari'ah governance framework. One of 
the roles of the Shari'ah supervisory board is to advise the Islamic financial 
instutions on Shari'ah matters to ensure conformity with Shari'ah rule in its 
operations at all time, endorsing and validating relevant documentations 
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pertaining to the products and services of the Islamic financial institutions. 
The ideal role of Shari'ah supervision involve ex ante and ex post aspects of 
Shari'ah governance and these include Shari'ah pronouncement, supervision and 
review.In this aspect, the Sharia governance framework in Malaysia is based on 
the centralised model as compared to the decentralized being practiced in the 
GCC  countries. The centralized model is formed on the basis that the Central 
Bank itself has its own Shari'ah supervisory board called the shari‘a Advisory 
Board by virtue of section 51 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 and 
all Islamic financial institutions are required to form their own Shari'ah 
committee which must comply with the rules set by the  shari‘a 
 Advisory Board of the Central Bank. The importance of shari‘a 
 supervision is derived from five different resources namely religious, 
social, economic, legal and governance. The religious position is derived from 
the ability of shari‘a scholars in understanding and interpreting Shari'ah 
principles to others. The social power of the Shari'ah supervision provides 
confidence to the stakeholders about the legitimacy of the transactions and 
activities of the Islamic financial institutions. The economic power of the 
shari‘a supervision can be seen from the fact that the profitability of an 
Islamic financial institution is dependent on the performance of Shari'ah 
scholars. As far as legal power is concerned it is derived from a variety of 
sources including regulators of the respective countries. The hierarchical 
position of  shari‘a supervision under the shareholders of the
 Islamic  financial institutions emphasizes it supremacy 
over other governance organs thus giving them authority to set their internal 
policy including task, responsibilities and relations with other governance 
organs in the Islamic financial institutions. 
The Shari'ah governance which refers to all the elements about the active role of 
the Shari'ah board and compliance with Shari'ah is fundamental to Islamic banks 
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in particular and the implementation of Shari'ah governance is encouraged by 
international institutions of regulations like Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) and Islamic Financial 
Services Board Shari'ah board monitoring 
The SSB plays very important role in ensuring good Shari'ah governance. The 
role of the SSB is to include advising board of directors on Shari'ah matters to 
ensure that the operations comply with Shari'ah principles at all time, endorsing 
and validating relevant documentations pertaining to the products and services, 
as well as the internal policies and manuals and marketing advertisements. 
Dynamic and good Shari'ah governance is the very essence in the 
development of Islamic banking and finance sector in Malaysia. Good Shari'ah 
governance guarantees the dynamicity of Islamic financial growth. 
The interest of stakeholders may extend beyond the financial interest to ethical, 
religious or other values when requiring good corporate governance. In 
Islamic banks shareholders and Islamic scholars requires the operation of services 
offered to be under Shari'ah law otherwise it will be subject to process in no 
permission. Therefore, corporate governance through Shari'ah operation is 
essential. 
Each Islamic bank or financial institution has in-house religious advisers, 
collectively known as SSB, as part of the internal governance structure of the 
institution, in some countries, authorities have created oversight arrangement, 
such as Shari'ah board in Islamic banking departments within supervisory 
agencies. These usually operate in connection with private independent market 
agents familiar with Islamic finance. 
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SSB prerogatives lie  in five  main  areas: certification  of permissible financial 
instruments though fatwas (ex ante Shari'ah audit), verification of transactions’ 
compliance with issued fatwa (ex post Shari'ah audit) the calculation and 
payment of Zakat, disposal of non Shari'ahpayment compliant earning, advise 
to the distribution of income or expenses among the bank shareholders and 
investment account holders. Each SBB issues a report to certify the Shari'ah 
compliance of all financial transactions. In addition to SSB, most Islamic 
financial institutions have established another internal Shari'ah Review 
structure namely Shari'ah Review units. These units are independent of other 
departments or are an integral part of the internal audit and control department. 
In recent years, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has developed 
three Guiding Principles to help strengthen governance structures and 
processes in various segments of the Islamic financial services industry (IFSI) 
in line with its mandate to promote soundness and stability of the Islamic 
financial system.It was noted that in all three projects, concerns over the roles 
and functions of the Shari`ah boards, which constitute part of the broader 
governance system, have been a recurring theme. This is crucial,considering 
that compliance with Shari`ah rules and principles is the raison d'être of the 
IFSI. In fact, other IFSB standards – such as those on risk management, capital 
adequacy and supervisory review process – also contain requirements and 
recommendations aimed at ensuring that an appropriate Shari`ah governance 
system is in place. 
Consequently, the IFSB Council, during its ninth meeting in Jeddah, 
approved the preparation of a set of Guiding Principles on the Shari`ah 
governance system, which is expected to: 
 
 
(a) complement other prudential standards issued by the IFSB by highlighting 
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in more detail to the supervisory authorities in particular, and the industry’s other 
stakeholders in general, the components of a sound Shari`ah governance system, 
especially with regard to the competence, independence, confidentiality and 
consistency of Shari`ah boards; 
(b) facilitate better understanding of Shari`ah governance issues and how 
stakeholders should satisfy themselves that an appropriate and effective 
Shari`ah governance system is in place; 
(c) provide an enhanced degree of transparency in terms of issuance, and the 
audit/review process for compliance with Shari`ah rulings; and 
(d) provide greater harmonisation of the Shari`ah governance structures and 
procedures across jurisdictions, especially since there are increasing numbers of 
IIFS with cross-border operations. 
 
 
 
D. Definition and Scope of Shari'a Governance System 
 
 
The term “Shari'a Governance System”, despite being commonly used within 
the IFSI to refer to structures and processes adopted by stakeholders in the 
IFSI (from financial regulators to market players) to ensure compliance with 
Shari'a rules and principles, has not been properly defined in any of the 
existing standards. In the interests of clarity, this document shall adopt the 
following definition of “Shari'a Governance System” and the other key 
terminology: 
“Shari'a Governance System” refers to the set of institutional and organisational 
arrangements through which an IIFS ensures that there is effective independent 
oversight of Shari'a compliance over each of the following structures and 
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processes: 
(a) Issuance of relevant Shari'a pronouncements/resolutions “Shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions” refers to a juristic opinion on any matter 
pertaining to Shari`ah issues in Islamic finance, given by the appropriately 
mandated Shari`ah board. In jurisdictions where there is a central authority such 
as the national Shari`ah board or Fatwa Council, that central authority has the 
power to issue such pronouncements/resolutions, resulting in the Shari`ah 
board at the IIFS usually focusing only on ensuring that the IIFS is compliant 
with the pronouncements/resolutions issued by the central authority.Once it 
is decided that a Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution should actually be 
implemented, it becomes a “Shari`ah ruling” (hukm al-Shar’i) with full legal 
effect that binds the IIFS.A Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution shall be 
issued only through appropriate due processes, which, amongst others, should 
involve rigorous deliberation among members of the Shari`ah  board  over  
any  proposed  Shari`ah-compliant  products  or transactions that require a 
Shari'a endorsement, as well as detailed scrutiny of the legal contracts and 
other documents relevant to the products or transactions. 
(b) Dissemination of information on such shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions to the operative personnel of the IIFS who monitor 
the day-to-day compliance with the shari'a pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-
vis every level of operations and each transaction Such a task would normally 
be undertaken by a designated “internal Shari`ah compliance unit/department 
(ISCU)”, or at least a Shari`ah compliance officer who is part of the IIFS’s 
compliance team. The IIFS shall equip the ISCU with the appropriate 
compliance- monitoring skills and relevant knowledge of the shari'a – for 
example, by assembling a team of staff with the two different skill-sets. The 
IIFS should also ensure that the ISCU is separate and independent from the 
business units and departments. 
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(c) An internal Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that Shari`ah 
compliance has been satisfied,during which any incident of non-compliance 
will be recorded and reported, and as far as possible, addressed and rectified 
IFSB-3 sets out that Shari`ah pronouncements/ resolutions issued by the 
Shari`ah boards should be strictly adhered to. The internal Shari`ah review 
would therefore be assigned to someone adequately trained in Shari`ah 
compliance review/audit, so that he or she would have a competent grasp of the 
process. 
While  the  ISCU  is  part  of  the  IIFS’s  compliance  team,the  internal 
Shari`ah review/audit unit/department (ISRU) may be established to 
function in a similar manner to the IIFS’s internal audit team. The major 
difference is that while the internal auditor will usually report to the Audit 
Committee, the ISRU shall report to the Shari`ah board. 
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Where appropriate, the internal Shari`ah review/audit reports shall require or 
recommend the management of the IIFS to address and rectify any issues of 
Shari`ah compliance. 
(d) An annual Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that the 
internal Shari`ah compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried out 
and its findings have been duly noted by the Shari`ah board The Shari`ah 
board who issued the Shari`ah pronouncements/resolutions can take charge 
of this process, having received feedback and reports from the ISRU. 
Alternatively, this task may be assigned to an appropriately competent 
external auditor or external shari'a firm. 
The shari'a board or shari'a advisory firm that carries out the shari'a 
compliance review/audit shall produce reports, indicating whether the IIFS 
has complied with shari'a requirements throughout the financial year. 
Where appropriate and if deemed necessary, there could be two sets of reports 
produced: a general statement of compliance that should be included in the 
annual report of the IIFS; and a more detailed account of compliance work 
undertaken addressed specifically to 
the supervisory authorities. 
 
 
E. Shari'ah Governance Model from Regulatory Perspective 
 
Shari'ah governance system as defined by The IFSB Guiding Principles on 
Sharia Governance System in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services 
(IFSB-10) refers to a set of institutional and organizational arrangements  
to  oversee shari‘a compliance  aspects  in  Islamic Financial
 Institutions (IFIs). In this  regard, majority of IFIs have 
established their own Shari'ah board and some of them even have set up a 
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dedicated internal Shari'ah review unit or department to support Shari'ah board 
in performing its function. This indicates a positive development on the aspect 
of Shari'ah governance system in IFIs. Looking at the different framework 
and style of   Shari'ah  governance in various legal environment and diverse 
banking models. 
The existing framework of Islamic finance in various jurisdictions 
demonstrates diverse practices and models of Shari'ah governance system. 
Some jurisdictions prefer greater  involvement of regulatory authorities and 
some countries on the other hand favor otherwise. Until now, it is still 
debatable whether the former or the latter is more prevalent and appropriate 
for possible adoption. To illustrate these diverse approaches, this study identifies 
five Shari'ah governance models in the context of regulatory perspective. 
 
5. Reactive Approach 
This model is more prevalent in non-Islamic legal environment countries 
such as United Kingdom and Turkey. Although several Islamic banking 
licenses have been issued to IFIs, the regulatory authority is silent upon 
the Shari'ah governance framework. Like any other conventional banks, 
IFIs are required to comply with existing legislations and regulations. On 
top of that, IFIs have duty to make sure that all their business operation and 
products are Shari'ah compliant. There is no specific legislation governing 
IFIs as well as any directive specifying Shari'ah governance framework. At 
this point, 
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the regulators will only react and intervene the Shari'ah governance matters 
if there is any significance issue involved which may affect the industry. For 
instance, the UK Financial Services Authority only concerns on the roles play 
by the Shari'ahboard of IFIs to be advisory and supervisory and not executive 
in nature. 
 
6. Passive Approach 
 
This model is exclusive to Shari'ah governance model in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Authority Monetary Agency (SAMA) treats IFIs equal to their 
conventional counterparts. SAMA has yet to issue legislation pertaining to 
Islamic finance and guidelines on Shari'ah governance system. There is no 
national Shari'ah advisory board or any institutions to be the sole 
authoritative body in Islamic finance. The existing Shari'ah governance 
system as practiced by IFIs in the Kingdom is a product of self initiative 
rather than regulatory requirement or  regulator’s direction. 
 
7. Minimalist Approach 
This model is mainly practiced by the GCC countries with the exception of 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, the minimalist model 
allows slight intervention on the part of regulatory authorities. The regulatory 
authorities expect IFIs to have proper Shari'ah governance system without 
specifying the requirements in details. There is no restriction on multiple 
appointments of the Shari'ah board to seat in various institutions at one 
particular time. Some jurisdictions in the GCC countries such as Bahrain,  
Dubai  and  Qatar  favor  the    adoption  of  the  AAOIFI Governance 
Standards. The minimalist approach prefers the market  to develop its own
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 shari‘a governance system rather than greater intervention on the 
part of regulators. 
8. Pro-Active Approach 
This model is favorable by Malaysian regulatory authority. The proponent of 
this model has strong faith in regulatory-based approach in strengthening 
Shari'ah governance framework. With this motivation, Malaysian regulator 
initiates comprehensive Shari'ah governance framework from regulatory and 
non-regulatory aspects. There are several laws were passed and amended by the 
parliament such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983, the Takaful Act 1984, 
the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1984 and the Securities 
Commission Act 1993. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 confirms the 
status of National Shari'ah Advisory Council (SAC) to be the sole 
authoritative body in Islamic finance. Furthermore, the Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) has  issued the Guidelines on the Governance of Shari'ah Committee 
for the Islamic Financial Institutions known as the BNM/GPS1. To 
complement this, the Securities Commission of Malaysia issued the 
Registration of Shari'ah Advisers Guidelines 2009 which setting up the 
criteria for the registration of a Shari'ah adviser in the capital market sector. 
 
9. Interventionist Approach. 
While passive approach is exclusive to Saudi Arabia, interventionist model 
is unique to Shari'ah governance model in Pakistan. The interventionist 
model allows third party institution to make decision on Shari'ah matters 
pertaining to Islamic finance. In the case   of Pakistan, the   Shari'ah  Federal 
Court is the highest authority   in   matters   involving   Islamic   finance  
despite  of  the  establishment of Shari'ah board at the State Bank of Pakistan 
level. 
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Shareholders increasingly expect  companies  to adhere to strict standards of 
corporate governance. In essence, corporate governance is the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled and involves adopting structures 
and processes which incorporate the values of fairness, transparency and 
accountability. The practical objective of corporate governance is to put in 
place a system which will deliver a company’s business objectives, i.e. 
increasing shareholder value, whilst managing risk. Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) share the same practical and business objectives, but are 
subject to an additional layer of compliance with Shari'ah rules and principles. 
An IFI does not only seek to make a profit, it seeks to make such profit in a 
socially responsible manner. 
The IFSB has recently released a number of exposure drafts providing ‘Guiding 
Principles’ specifically aimed at Islamic financial institutions. The aim is not 
thereby to establish an entirely new governance framework for the Islamic 
finance industry, but rather to build on and complement existing international 
standards and encourage institutions to view compliance as part of a general 
strengthening of good corporate governance culture. 
Principles of good business conduct are desirable in terms of protecting investor 
interests and enhancing the integrity of the institutions concerned. It is also 
a requirement under Shari'ah that companies observe principles of ethical 
business conduct. Furthermore, the principles of certainty and transparency 
underpin the validity of a Shari'ah compliant contract. 
 
Three recent exposure drafts, published in December 2008, offer ‘Guiding 
Principles’ on Conduct of Business for Institutions offering only Islamic 
Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and 
Islamic Mutual Funds) (the Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business), 
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Shari'ah Governance System and Governance for Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
Operations (the exposure drafts). These exposure drafts build on existing 
corporate governance and other IFSB standards. This briefing focuses on the 
first two. 
The Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business adopt a principles-based rather 
than a purely rules-based approach. It is intended that the seven principles 
outlined in the exposure draft will form the basis of a code of business conduct 
which is observed by all IFIs, and which complements existing standards. 
Principle 1 
Honesty and Fairness - IFIs should treat all shareholders fairly and aspire to the 
highest standards of honesty and integrity in all their dealings with them. 
Principle 2 
Due Care and Diligence - IFIs should  exercise due care, skill and diligence 
in their dealings with all categories of investors. An IFI will be expected to 
carry out proper evaluations of risk in relation to any investment activity and 
undertake appropriate reviews of the process of obtaining Shari'ah approval and 
of the Shari'ah compliance of asset portfolios. 
Principle 3 
Capabilities - an IFI must ensure that its senior management, staff and 
representatives are capable of discharging their duties competently. In 
particular, it is expected that those parties will have an appropriate 
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understanding of Shari'ah and this principle must be continually kept under 
review. 
Principle 4 
Information about Clients - an IFI must undertake “know your customer” checks to 
ensure that an investor’s business and the purpose of any financing are consistent 
with Shari'ah rules and principles. 
Principle 5 
Information to Clients - reporting processes must be transparent and fair. An IFI must 
protect investors and potential investors by providing them with information that 
appropriately reflects the nature of its products and services, and the associated risks. 
Principle 6 
Conflicts of Interest and Duty - as far as possible, an IFI should avoid situations 
which create a conflict of interest. Where this cannot be avoided, the situation 
should be managed to ensure that all stakeholders are treated fairly and any issues are 
addressed in a transparent and open manner. 
Principle 7 
Shari'ah Compliance - an IFI must adopt and implement appropriate Shari'ah 
governance systems in order to monitor its Shari'ah compliance. Since Shari'ah 
compliance is of paramount importance in the context of IFIs, this issue is 
addressed more fully in a separate exposure draft as set out below. 
 
Previous IFSB publications highlighted a particular concern over the role and 
function of Shari'ah boards within the Islamic financial services industry. 
Shari'ah boards play a key role in advising institutions on their compliance  with  
Shari'ah    rules  and  principles.  Whilst  other  IFSB publications have contained 
recommendations for ensuring appropriate Shari'ah governance systems are in 
place, the Guiding Principles on Shari'ah Governance System were a response to 
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the industry’s need for greater clarity in this fundamental area. 
‘Shari'ah Governance’ is defined as the set of institutional and organisational 
arrangements through which an IFI ensures that there is effective independent 
supervision of, in particular, the issue and dissemination of Shari'ah 
pronouncements, and internal and external Shari'ah compliance reviews. 
Principle 1 
General Approach - various different Shari'ah governance structures have been 
adopted in different jurisdictions, and systems adopted should be proportionate to 
the size, complexity and nature of the business. Shari'ah boards should have a clear 
mandate and be equipped with operative procedures and reporting lines to provide 
effective Shari'ah governance. Principle 2 
Competence - the choice of the scholars and other individuals whose role is to 
provide Shari'ah advice should be made on the basis of an individual’s honesty, 
good character and possession of the necessary qualifications to understand the 
technical requirements of the business. The need for ongoing professional 
development of such individuals is also crucial to ensure that they are kept 
up-to-date with legislative changes and industry-specific knowledge. Shari'ah 
boards should be regularly assessed in relation to objective performance criteria 
and be accountable to the board of directors. 
Principle 3 
Independence - no individual member of a Shari'ah board should be ‘connected’  
with  the  company  or  serve  another  function  within  the company. Each member 
should be capable of exercising independent judgement. The management of the 
IFI should ensure that all relevant information is supplied to the Shari'ah board 
promptly and in such a manner that enables the board to discharge its duties 
properly. This will involve allowing the Shari'ah board independent access to 
senior management and providing for any further enquiries that may be made. 
Principle 4 
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Confidentiality - members of the Shari'ah board will inevitably be exposed to 
commercially sensitive inside information in the discharge of their duties. As 
part of an IFI’s broader risk management processes therefore, it should ensure that 
adequate confidentiality clauses are included in each member’s service contract. 
There should also be an appropriate procedure for dealing with leaks of inside 
information, which may include some form of disciplinary action. 
Principle 5 
Consistency - decisions of Shari'ah boards should be consistent and, as far as 
possible, follow the pronouncements of the central Shari'ah authority in the 
relevant jurisdiction, where applicable. Where no such authority exists, it is 
recommended that the Shari'ah board uses best efforts to conform to any previous 
rulings and to publish its decisions so that they may be openly and transparently 
assessed. 
The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
The rule relating to Shari'ah governance is provided under section 30 until section 36 
of IFSA 2013 whereby the existence of these provisions highlighted the 
intention of the law maker, in focusing to the matters pertaining to appointment 
and qualification of the Shari'ah Committees members in Islamic financial 
institution. Unlike the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 which merely touched 
the surface of the matter by highlighting the general requirement for financial 
institution to have a Shari'ah committee, the current provision provides a more 
specific requirement under section 30 of IFSA 2013 which requires an institution to 
apply directly to the Central Bank for the establishment of Shari'ah Committee. 
This will enable the Central Bank to have direct information as to the members of 
the Shari'ah Committee in an Islamic financial institution, which at the same 
time, to ensure a proper supervision towards the activities conducted. (Miskam 
& Nasrul  2013) 
Another  major  point  being  made  available  under  the  new   Shari'ah 
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governance legal provision is the criteria of the members of Shari'ah 
Committee. A clear standard of requirement pertaining to the 
appointment of such committee is highlighted under section 31 which is to be 
crossed referred with section section 29 (2) (a) which states only those who is 
really fit and qualified may be appointed as the Shari'ah Committee members. This 
leads to the notion that members of Shari'ah Committees in every financial 
institution must be chaired by those who met the requirements as stated by the 
Central Bank. 
Availability of such clause would be vital in ensuring the products and services 
introduced by the Islamic financial institution complied with the Shari'ah principles 
via the supervision of competent members. 
Section 32 of IFSA 2013 contributes to the significance of Shari'ah Committees in 
every institution through the introduction of the Shari'ah governance which not 
only set out the duties of the Shari'ah committees in the institution, but rather blend 
into the structure of the company itself. By extending the powers of Shari'ah 
governance into certain aspects in a company such as matters involving the board 
of directors and internal Shari'ah compliance, we can understand that Shari'ah 
governance would  be one of the integral parts in an institution up to the point that 
Shari'ah comittee may no longer be treated as a minor part or division of a company, 
what more against the idea of abandoning such 
governance rules. 
The introduction of under section 33 and 34 of IFSA, on the other hand, enables the 
Central Bank to continuously be updated by the institution of its Shari'ah Committee 
members. In order to maintain its aim of ensuring that only those who really 
qualifies entitled to be the members, the provision set out the clause relating to 
the cessation of the members including situations which would disqualifies from 
becoming Shari'ah committee members. 
By setting out a more precise rules and features of the Shari'ah committee members, 
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the IFSA 2013 under section 35 has made it compulsory for management in charge 
of the company to provide information to the Shari'ah committee in exercising 
its task and duties. While the Act did not mention the type and degree of information 
required, it can be assumed that the Shari'ah Committee is authorised to obtain 
regardless of any kind, if such information would assist them in carrying out their 
duties. (Miskam & Nasrul  2013) 
In addition, section 36 marks the trust which has been given by the legislation 
over the Shari'ah Committee to hold any type of information including the 
confidential ones provided such information is not being relayed to the other 
persons. While maintaining the duty of confidentiality, the Shari'ah committees 
are also vested with the protection under the qualified privilege which prevents 
them from being taken a legal action by the Islamic financial institution, if it can be 
proven that such duties was conducted in good faith. 
The provision clauses as to the Shari'ah governance is one of the major features 
being introduced under the IFSA 2013 which contributes to the  boost of authorities 
as well as roles of the Shari'ah Committee, thus ensuring the activities of the 
Islamic financial institution to be under Shari'ah compliance thus maintaining a 
sound and robust Shari'ah governance framework in Islamic financial industry in 
Malaysia. 
 
IV. EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Corporate governance has gained great prominence over the last three decades 
even in the conventional financial system because of continued financial instability. 
It would be of even greater importance in the Islamic system because of the 
additional risk to which the depositors would get exposed when the banks really 
start moving into the risk-sharing modes. This poses an important challenge before 
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Islamic banks to improve all crucial aspects of corporate governance. The 
challenge will become more serious as these institutions expand and their 
problems become more complex. This challenge could be successfully met if the 
Board of Directors and Senior Management become more effective in the 
performance of their responsibilities.(Chapra and Ahmed 2002) 
Effective corporate governance in banks as well as the firms that use bank funds is 
one of the most important pillars of the new environment that needs to be created to 
replace the old socio-economic environment that no longer exists. Unfortunately, 
however, corporate governance is considered to be generally weak in the 
corporations of  most developing countries. This is because all the institutions that 
play a crucial role in disciplining markets and ensuring efficiency and integrity are 
not well-developed in these countries. Information asymmetries are more severe, 
market participants less experienced, and regulations, even if they exist, do not get 
enforced effectively and impartially because of political corruption and the general 
weakness of judicial systems. Disclosures are also not adequate and accounting 
practices are not well developed. Consequently, these corporations suffer from 
inefficiencies and inequities that adversely affect all stakeholders. The adverse 
effects of ineffective corporate governance can be more serious in the case of 
financial institutions because the number of their stakeholders is much larger and 
the systemic risks are much greater.There is no reason to assume that, even though 
the Islamic financial institutions have done fairly well so far, they have necessarily 
been able to escape the trappings of the prevailing weak corporate governance in 
developing countries. It should be possible to improve their performance 
considerably and to serve the interests of all stakeholders much better by making 
corporate governance more effective in these institutions.Therefore, the strong 
rationale for greater reliance on equity in an Islamic economy intensifies the need 
for adoption of all those measures that would not only help improve the functioning 
of the financial system but also safeguard the interests of all stakeholders. (Chapra 
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and Ahmed 2002) 
 
Without effective corporate governance, it may not be possible to strengthen Islamic 
banks and to enable them to expand rapidly and perform their role effectively. This 
need will become more and more serious as the institutions expand and their 
problems become more complex – problems which will erode their ability in the 
long-run to meet successfully the challenges that they face. It is, therefore, not 
possible to avoid the taking of all those measures that would help improve the 
functioning of these institutions. 
 
For this purpose, it is important to sharpen the tools of corporate governance, the 
most important of which are: internal controls, risk management, transparency, 
loan accounting and disclosure, Shari'ah clearance and audit, external audit, and 
prudential regulation and supervision. Total reliance on these would, however, not 
be sufficient. Moral commitment on the part of all market operators is 
indispensable. Without such commitment, market operators will find different 
ways of violating the law without getting detected and punished. This will create 
the need for more and more legal checks and controls, which will raise transactions 
costs to an unbearably high level. Making them truly accountable before 
shareholders and depositors by the adoption of measures discussed in this paper 
should also be of great help. What is also needed is the establishment of a number 
of shared institutions as discussed above. Without such institutions even banks 
with the best corporate governance may not be able to avoid crises. 
 
However, corporate governance is generally weak in all countries and particularly 
so in developing  countries, in  which category nearly all Muslim countries fall 
at present. This is because all the institutions that play a crucial role in disciplining 
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markets and ensuring efficiency and integrity are not well-developed in these 
countries. Information asymmetries are more severe, market participants less 
experienced, and regulations, even if they exist, do not always get enforced 
effectively and impartially because of political corruption and the general weakness 
of judicial systems. Disclosures are also not adequate and accounting practices 
are not well developed. The adverse effects of ineffective corporate governance 
can be more serious in the case of financial institutions because their leverage 
is much higher, the number of their stakeholders is more extensive, and the systemic 
risks of their failure are far more serious. There is no reason to assume that, even 
though the Islamic financial institutions have done fairly well so far, they 
have necessarily been able to escape the trappings of the prevailing weak 
corporate governance in developing countries. It is, therefore, not possible to 
avoid the taking of all those measures that would help improve the functioning 
of these institutions. The role of the Board of Directors  and  Senior  Management  
is  of  crucial  importance  in  this  respect. It is gratifying to note that almost 
all Muslim countries are presently in the process of implementing the BCBS 
guidelines.(HASAN 2011)  
 
A. The Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors cannot, however, play this role effectively if its members 
do not have  a  high  degree  of moral  integrity as well  as professional competence 
in banking business. They must be adequately aware of the risks and complexities 
involved in the banking business. In an Islamic system, they must have the 
additional qualification of being well-versed in the Shari'ah and its objectives and 
in particular the rationale behind the prohibition of interest. They should ensure 
adequate transparency in keeping with the standards laid down by the BCBS, the 
IFSB and the supervisory authority of their own country through a smooth flow of 
relevant information to directors, senior Management, auditors, supervisors, 
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shareholders, depositors and the public according to the needs of each with a view 
to ensure a proper check on the affairs of the bank. They must establish  a strong 
internal control system, proper accounting procedures, effective internal and 
external audit, efficient risk management, and all necessary checks and balances, 
rules, regulations and procedures.(HASAN 2011) 
 
Experience has shown that directors do not necessarily perform their roles 
effectively. There are a number of reasons for this. One of these is that the Board 
members may not necessarily have the professional competence and the moral 
integrity that are needed to manage the bank efficiently. Another reason is that 
Board members are not always genuinely elected by shareholders and are not 
necessarily accountable before them. Elections do not take place regularly at 
defined intervals and, even if they do, evidence  indicates that shareholders are  
not actively involved in the election or removal of directors. This enables board 
members to perpetuate themselves and it is generally difficult to dislodge them 
except through takeovers. These are, however, expensive and potentially disruptive 
and, may not, therefore, be a possible remedy except in extreme cases. To correct 
this situation, it is necessary to have a transparent procedure for elections and to 
adopt measures that would enable minority shareholders and investment depositors 
to have a say in Board decisions. It is also necessary to enable shareholders to 
remove Board members in the event of their performance falling far short of what 
they expect. It is, therefore, imperative to institute reforms in election procedures 
as well as proxy rules to enable shareholders to elect competent and conscientious 
persons to the Board of Directors and to prevent them from perpetuating 
themselves in spite of their poor performance. 
 
It is also necessary to develop a legal and regulatory infrastructure to protect the 
rights of not only minority shareholders but also depositors (both being outsiders). 
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In a number of countries companies are allowed to ask registered shareholders, who 
are unable to attend general meetings, to transfer their votes to the Board of 
Directors. This further strengthens the hands of the Board and enables it to control 
decisions at shareholder meetings. Since the transfer of voting rights often leads to 
far-reaching consequences, which may not always be in the interest of all 
stakeholders, it would be desirable to transfer voting rights to shareholder 
associations, if they exist. If such associations do not exist, then voting rights may 
be transferred to supervisory authorities or to specialized chartered firms 
established in the private sector to protect  the interest of stakeholders against a fee 
as discussed later. All three of these institutions would perhaps be better qualified 
to protect the interests of stakeholders.(Hasan 2010) 
 
It would also be helpful if there are an adequate number of non-executive directors 
on the Board. Empirical evidence in the conventional system indicates that non-
executive directors influence positively a Board’s capabilities to evaluate and 
discipline managers. This is perhaps because such directors do not have any 
management responsibility and may not, therefore, have a vested interest in 
protecting the management. They may, therefore, be expected to attach greater 
weight to the interests of minority shareholders and depositors and, thereby, 
help inject equity into the company. If they do not come up to this expectation, they 
would hurt their own reputation in the directors’ labour market. Removal of 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) caused by poor performance is more likely 
in outsider dominated Boards than in insider dominated ones. However, here too 
there are problems. If the non- executive directors have not been elected by 
shareholders but rather handpicked by the dominant shareholder or the CEO, they 
would owe their careers to him and would, therefore, ‘lack the information 
and incentives required to provide consistent effective corporate governance’. 
There will, thus, be conflict of interest, which will create a lack of willingness on 
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their part to discipline senior management. Moreover, Board meetings may not be  
frequent and  non-executive directors may not, therefore, be able to monitor the 
activities of the company effectively and ensure correction, particularly if overt 
criticism of management policies in board meetings is considered to be rude 
Since   Islamic   banks   are   generally   small   compared   with   their conventional 
counterparts even in Muslim countries, leave alone the rest of the world, the amount 
of capital held by them is also very small. This enables concentration of shares in 
the hands of a few executive directors. The number of non-executive directors 
who can serve as a check on the executive directors is also accordingly small. 
Since the small size as well as the concentration of shareholdings carries the 
potential of leading to undesired consequences for protecting the interests of all 
stakeholders, it is desirable to enlarge the size of banks and to institute legal reforms 
with the objective of reducing concentration, diversifying risks, and increasing the 
ability of these banks to absorb losses. 
 
It would also be desirable to introduce some other reforms to make the Board of 
Directors more effective in its functions. One of these, which needs to be 
considered seriously, is to relate the remuneration of Board members to their 
performance in the same way as required in mudaraba contracts. The directors in 
their capacity as mudaribs (managing entrepreneurs) should be compensated for 
only their actual expenses and not be entitled to a fixed management fee or 
remuneration as they do in modern corporations. Their remuneration should be 
a certain percent of the profit earned by the bank, if the bank makes a profit. This 
must be in addition to their normal share in profit like other shareholders on the basis 
of their shareholdings. The percentage share of profits to be allocated to the directors 
for their management services must be clearly specified in the Articles of 
Agreement so that it is well-known to the shareholders. If the corporation makes 
a profit, the directors get the specified percent of profit for their services. But if 
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the corporation makes a  loss,  the  directors  do  not,  like  the  mudarib,  get  a 
‘fee’  for  their management services, and should share in the losses in proportion 
to their stockholdings. The directors would thus get a reward for their services 
only if they have contributed to profits – the higher the profit, the greater their 
reward. This should prove to be an incentive to them for better 
performance.(HASAN 2011) 
 
B. Senior management 
While the Board of Directors refers to persons who are generally not only 
shareholders themselves but also participate in the governance of the bank, senior 
management refers to the CEO and other senior members of the staff who perform 
management functions but are not necessarily shareholders. Modern corporations 
are in general not managed by their owners (shareholders). Instead, professional 
managers are hired to run the business. They are ‘fiduciaries’.1 This creates the 
principal/agent problem and leads to a conflict of interests. It is, therefore, necessary 
to impose restrictions on self-dealing, fraud, excessive compensation in different 
hidden forms, and other malpractices. 
 
One of the  most important constraints on  management is that key positions 
should not be held by one person (‘four eyes principle’). Since the CEO and the 
Chairman of the Board perform two distinct functions in the bank, it would be 
preferable to have two different persons holding these positions so that there is a 
clear division of responsibilities at the top of the bank to ensure independence 
and balance of power and authority. Neither the directors nor the management 
should be allowed to stay on the job if they are no longer competent or qualified to 
run the bank. As argued by Jensen and Ruback, poor managers who resist being 
replaced might be the costliest manifestation of the agency problem.(HASAN 
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2011) 
It is the responsibility of the Board of Directors and senior management to ensure 
proper internal controls, and effective management of all risks, including credit risk, 
liquidity risk, interest-rate risk, and operational risks. Even though the exposure of 
most Islamic banks to these risks seems to be relatively high, they have been able to 
manage them fairly well so far. Nevertheless, this may not necessarily continue 
in the future. It is, therefore, extremely important to cultivate an effective risk 
management culture in these banks to ensure their competitiveness and survival in 
a world full of uncertainties and crises. This cannot, however, be done without 
the active collaboration of Board of Directors, senior management, the Shari'ah 
scholars, and bank supervisors. 
C. Regulatory and Internal Frameworks 
 
 
 
1. Proactive Approach and Integrated Corporate and Sharī'ah 
Governance 
 
 
In view of the numerous challenges faced by Islamic finance, it is 
recommended that the industry needs a regulatory-based approach framework 
as explained before. As a prerequisite, Shari'a governance must be part of the 
concerns of regulators and policymakers. The regulators should proactively 
monitor the implementation of Shari'a governance and learn from the experience 
of other jurisdictions in nurturing the Shari'a governance framework. The   
principle   of   ‘one-size-fits-all’   Shari'a   governance   is   not appropriate as 
the market and local legal environments are different 
from one place to another.In designing the Shari'a governance framework, it is a 
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matter of necessity to have an integrated corporate and Shari'a governance 
framework. These two things must not be segregated as they complement each 
other. In this aspect, the principles or guidelines on corporate governance must 
take into account the element of Shari'a governance when it involves institutions 
offering Islamic financial services. This is important because the stakeholder-
oriented model of governance in IFIs requires them to protect the rights and 
interests of all stakeholders.(HASAN 2011) 
 
2. Supervision and Enforcement 
 
 
The regulators should have a comprehensive framework in the aspects of 
supervision and enforcement and these include written guidelines on supervision 
for supervisors, directives for IFIs issued by supervisors, sufficient resources with 
adequate knowledge on Sharī'ah governance-related matters and full authority to 
carry out the enforcement functions.  The supervisors should provide guidelines 
and make sure that they evaluate the internal policies and procedures as well as 
the implementation of these procedures. It is also important for the supervisors to 
consistently inspect the IFIs by having a proper framework in place which allows 
them to make an assessment of  IFIs’  Shari'ah governance policies and tools to 
redress any  deficiencies. 
 
 
3. Dispute Settlement 
 
 
It would be an ideal development if the regulators initiated a special bench for 
Islamic finance cases as part of the court’s structure. In this special bench, the 
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court may appoint judges who are knowledgeable in Islamic finance or the 
regulators may allocate a certain amount of funds to provide training for those 
judges. On top of that, a reliable Shari'ah litigation system must also be in place. 
It is understood that in a secular legal environment, such as in the UK, the above 
arrangement is slightly difficult to implement. Therefore, it is important for the 
regulators in the secular legal environment to consider a court referral to a s h a 
r i ‘ a board or a s h a r i ‘ a  expert  to determine cases involving s h a r i ‘ a issues. 
Alternatively, a special tribunal for Islamic finance cases may be established to 
handle  disputes involving IFIs in this kind of jurisdiction. 
 
 
The policymakers should also take into account other legal avenues for dispute 
settlement, such as arbitration and mediation.  At  this point in time, there are 
several institutions for international dispute resolution, such as the Dubai Centre 
for Arbitration and Conciliation, the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, the 
Bahrain Centre for International Commercial Arbitration Centre, the International 
Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, the London  Court  
of  International  Arbitration,  the  Kuwait  Centre  for 
Commercial Arbitration, the Kuala Lumpur Arbitration Centre and others. In view 
of these numerous arbitration centres, it is recommended that there should be one 
specific institution that offers alternative dispute resolutions and settlement for 
Islamic finance cases. Alternatively, the existing arbitration centres should 
develop and enhance their expertise and capabilities in Islamic finance in terms 
of resources, frameworks, procedures and facilities. At this point, these institutions 
for arbitration must prepare to facilitate themselves with necessary facilities and 
resources to address the need for dispute settlement involving Islamic finance 
cases.(Hasan 2010) 
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In order to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration, the decision or solution of 
the arbitration should be made binding and conclusive. The legally binding effect 
in arbitration is crucial for the purpose of ensuring credibility and confidence in 
any solution made in the arbitration. In spite of that, it is also important for the 
regulators to encourage arbitration as an alternative legal avenue for dispute 
settlement and to issue policies and procedures that clearly acknowledge Islamic 
law as the main source of law as a basis for decision-making. 
 
 
 
4. Well-conceived By-laws and Internal Policies 
 
 
Well-conceived by-laws and internal policies are prerequisites of effective 
Shari'ah governance. Realizing this, the IFIs should have appropriate by-laws and 
policies as guidelines for their internal use in terms of meeting  procedures, 
decision-making, preparing reports and dissemination of information, records and 
reviews. At this point, the IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI governance standards may 
be the basis for such by-laws, with some modifications that would be appropriate 
to be  implemented within the local market and regulatory environment. 
 
 
D. Attributes of the Shari'ah Board on Independence 
 
 
1. Method of Appointment 
There are significant differences in the method of appointment of the Shari'ah 
board between IFIs. It is also found that numerous IFIs did not comply with the 
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AAOIFI governance standards in that their appointments are made by the BOD 
and not the shareholders. In view of the actual market practice and more 
practical tools for ensuring independence, There are other mechanisms that would 
be appropriate to achieve such an objective. Firstly, the appointment must be made 
either by the BOD or the shareholders. Secondly, the appointment must be 
subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. Thirdly, the appointment must 
not be permanent but rather contractual subject to renewal. Fourthly, the 
termination and dismissal must also be subject to the approval of the regulatory 
authorities. 
 
 
2. Code of Conduct 
 
 
 
The majority of IFIs do not have a code of ethics for Shari'ah board. The existing 
practices seem to presume that Shari'ah board members are bound by Islamic 
ethical principles. In view of the need to have a certain and precise code of ethics 
specific and exclusive to the Shari'ah board, the regulatory authorities as well 
as the IFIs may prescribe certain acceptable behaviour for Shari'ah board 
members. It is incumbent upon the IFIs to initiate and develop an internal code of 
conduct for the Shari'ah board. This code of ethics should be enforceable and there 
must be a mechanism within the organizational structure to ensure its strict 
implementation. Breach of this code of ethics may incur disciplinary action 
such as suspension, termination or other kinds of sanctions. 
 
 
3. Professional Body 
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There is no professional body specifically established to set a standard practice for 
the Shari'ah board as is the case for other professionals such as lawyers, accountants, 
medical practitioners and engineers. The establishment of a professional body to 
set the qualifications of the Shari'ah board, to introduce a standard code of 
conduct, to develop a training programme and to enhance the professionalism of 
the Shari'ah board is consider necessary at this point in time. At the moment, 
different bodies attempt to provide qualification programmes for Shari'ah boards, 
such as the AAOIFI Certified Shari'ah Adviser and Auditor, the Scholar 
Development Program initiated by the IFC Islamic finance council and the 
SII and the IBFIM Shari'ah Scholars Introduction Program, but it was found that 
such qualifications have not been accepted universally. The study strongly 
recommends the establishment of The Association of  Shari`a Advisors at the 
national and international levels.235 With this association, the quality of the 
Shari'ah board can then also be rated by an independent agency similar to a credit-
rating agency. 
 
 
4. Remuneration Policy 
 
 
There are significant differences in the remuneration of different Shari'ah boards. 
The absence of any policy limitation or guidelines on the Shari'ah board’s 
remuneration may lead to unhealthy practices. The top ten Shari'ah scholars who 
dominated the board positions in IFIs around the world earn a very lucrative and 
significant amount of remuneration. It was found that a chairman of a Shari'ah 
board could earn USD50,000 to USD100,000 per board and a top scholar could 
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even gain up to USD250,000 on a typical capital markets deal. This study further 
estimates that the top five Shari'ah scholars may earn up to a million dollars per 
year for servicing more than a hundred board and chairman positions around the 
world. While there is no standard benchmark or scale fee for Shari'ah advisors, the 
regulators as well as the IFIs should establish a specific policy for the remuneration 
of Shari'ah board members based on the appropriate scale fees. In the context of 
the internal policy of IFIs, the Shari'ah board scale fees should be approved by the 
shareholders and disclosed in the annual report. 
 
 
5. Attributes of the Shari'ah Board on Confidentiality 
 
There were Shari'ah scholars who have unintentionally or indirectly disclosed some 
confidential information, particularly those sitting on the boards of numerous 
IFIs. In addition, the survey results indicated that 29% of IFIs view that the Shari'ah 
board is not fully aware of the issue of confidentiality. Realizing this, the IFIs 
should have a proper mechanism to resolve this issue and this includes terms 
of reference in the letter of appointment, enforcement of the code of ethics and 
disciplinary proceedings for any misconduct by the Shari'ah board. In defining 
the scope of confidentiality, a reference may be made to section 52 of the IFSB-
10. The IFSB-10 nevertheless does not provide guidelines for disciplinary 
proceedings in the event that Shari'ah board members breach confidentiality or 
disclose sensitive or confidential information. As such, the IFIs are recommended 
to have proper disciplinary proceedings, such as hearing procedures, and rules 
of evidence with an appropriate organizational structure. 
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GLOSSARY 
Bay` 
 
 
Sale or contract of sale. 
Bay` al-`Inah A contract involving the sale and buy-back transaction of assets by a 
seller. A seller sells an asset to a buyer on a cash basis and later buys 
it back on a deferred payment basis where the price is higher than the 
cash price. It can also be applied when a seller sells an asset to a 
buyer on a deferred basis and later buys it back on a cash basis, at a 
price which is lower than the deferred 
Commodity Murābahah A Murābahah-based purchase and sale transaction of Sharī`ah- 
compliant commodities, whereby the buyer purchases the 
commodities on a deferred payment basis and subsequently sells them 
to a third party on a cash payment basis. 
Darūrah Darūrah is an exigency in the event that if the necessary act is not 
done, then it shall lead to the destruction of five fundamental needs, 
namely religion, life, intelligence, progeny and property. The 
principle of Darūrah is only applicable in exceptional circumstances 
where the avoidance of the specific necessary act shall ruin the said 
fundamentals. 
Fatawa (singular Fatwa) A juristic opinion or pronouncement of facts given by the Sharī`ah 
board, a Mufti, or a Faqīh on any matter pertinent to Sharī`ah 
issues, based on the appropriate methodology. 
Gharar Deceptive uncertainty where details concerning the sale contract are 
unknown or uncertain. 
I`ādat Al Shirā’ Repurchase 
Ijārah An Ijārah contract is an agreement made by an institution offering 
Islamic financial services to lease to a customer an asset specified by 
the customer for an agreed period against specified instalments of 
lease rental. An Ijārah contract commences with a promise to lease 
that is binding on the part of the potential lessee prior to entering the 
Ijārah contract. 
Istisnā` An Istisnā` contract is an agreement to sell to a customer a non- 
existent asset, which is to be manufactured or built according to the 
buyer‟s specifications and is to be delivered on a specified future 
date at a pre-determined selling price. 
Kafālah Guarantee 
Kafālah bi al-Ujr Charging fee for guarantee 
Maslahah Public interest 
Maysir Gambling 
Mu`addal Ribh 
 
Floating rate 
Mu`addal Ribh Thābit Fixed rate 
Mubādalah Swap 
Mubādalah al-Arba`ah Profit rate swaps 
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Muḍārabah A Muḍārabah contract is an agreement between the capital provider 
and a skilled entrepreneur whereby the capital provider will contribute 
capital to an enterprise or activity, which is to be managed by the 
entrepreneur as the Muḍārib. Profits generated by that enterprise or 
activity are shared in accordance with the terms of the Muḍārabah 
agreement, whilst losses are to borne solely by the capital provider 
unless the losses are due to the Muḍārib’s misconduct, negligence or 
breach of contracted terms. 
Muḍārib Labour provider 
Murābahah A Murābahah contract is an agreement whereby the institution 
offering Islamic financial services sells to a customer a specified kind 
of asset that is already in their possession at cost plus an agreed profit 
margin (selling price). 
Mushārakah A Mushārakah contract is an agreement between the institution 
offering Islamic financial services and a customer to contribute capital 
to an enterprise, whether existing or new, or to own a real estate or 
moveable asset, either on a temporary or permanent basis. Profits 
generated by that enterprise or real estate/asset are shared in 
accordance with the terms of the Mushārakah agreement, whilst  
losses are shared in proportion to each partner‟s share of capital. 
Muslim A believer in or adherent of Islam. 
Qarḍ / Qarḍ al-Hasan A non-interest bearing loan intended to allow the borrower to use the 
loaned funds for a period with the understanding that the same amount 
of the loaned funds would be repaid at the end of the period. 
Rahn A contract to pledge a specified asset as security against a debt 
whereby the creditor (Murtahin) is entitled to hold custody of the 
asset. In the event of default by the debtor (Rāhin), the creditor may 
sell the asset. 
ReTakāful Islamic re-insurance 
Riba Usury 
Sadaqah (plural 
 
Donation 
Salam A Salam contract is an agreement to purchase, at a pre-determined 
price, a specified kind of commodity not available with the seller, 
which is to be delivered on a specified future date in a specified 
quantity and quality. The institution offering Islamic financial 
services, as the buyer, makes full payment of the purchase price upon 
execution of a Salam contract. The commodity may or may not be 
traded over the counter or on an exchange. 
Sharī`ah Divine Islamic law that encompasses all aspects of human life as 
revealed in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
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Sukūk (singular Sakk) Sukūk (certificates) each of which represents the holder‟s 
proportionate ownership in an undivided part of an underlying asset 
where the holder assumes all rights and obligations to such an asset. 
Tabarru’ Grant of property by a person with complete legal capacity without 
any compensation. In the context of Takāful operations, Tabarru’ is 
the amount of contribution to be relinquished by the Takāful 
participant as a donation for fulfilling the obligation of mutual help 
and to be used to pay claims submitted by eligible claimants. 
Tahawwut Hedging 
Takāful Takāful is derived from an Arabic word which means solidarity, 
whereby a group of participants agree among themselves to support 
one another jointly against a specified loss. In a Takāful arrangement, 
the participants contribute a sum of money as Tabarru’ (donation) into 
a common fund, which will be used for the mutual assistance of the 
members against specified loss or damage. 
Tawarruq Purchasing an asset with deferred price, either on the basis of 
Musawamah (sale contract without the disclosure of the asset cost 
price and profit margin to the buyer) or Murābahah, then selling it to 
a third party to obtain cash. 
Wa`d A promise to perform certain action(s) in the future. 
Wakālah An agency contract where the customer (principal) appoints the 
institution offering Islamic financial services as an agent (Wakīl) to 
carry out business on their behalf. 
Waqf (plural Awqāf) A property that produces income and that may have been deeded to 
benefit a community. 
Zakat Alms giving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Players in Corporate Governance (CG) of Islamic 
Financial  Institutions (IFIs) 
 
Environment Important Issues Objectives/ Responsibilities in CG 
Government 
(Laws and 
Regulations 
for IFIs) 
Laws facilitating operations 
of Islamic financial 
institutions 
Provide clear laws and 
regulations that cater to the 
needs of IFIs. 
Accounting System Accounting and Audit 
standards for clear and 
transparent communication 
of information 
Provide uniform, clear and 
transparent accounting 
standards 
Public Institutions   
Supervisors Stability and soundness of 
the financial system 
(eliminate systemic risk) 
Develop internal controls, 
risk management procedures, 
and standards of 
transparency 
Provide Guidelines for FIs 
Monitor overall operations in 
general and risky behavior in 
particular 
Banking 
Associations 
Provide minimum standards 
of CG 
Set Principles and Sound 
practices 
Institutional   
Shareholders Shareholder Rights Elect board members 
 Share in profit  
Board of Directors Ensure good management 
team 
Oversight of management 
Protect shareholders and 
investment depositors rights 
Set overall policy and 
strategy 
Accountability of the 
management 
Senior Management Operate the institution 
efficiently. 
Right balance between risk 
and return 
Efficient incentive-structure 
Implement the policies set by 
the board in a sound and 
responsible manner 
 
  
Internal Audit Quality and quantity of 
information 
Transparency of information 
Ensure that the policies set by 
Board are followed by the 
management (Compliance) 
Employees Skills and work ethics 
Right incentive-structure 
Meet the goals set by the 
management 
Minimize operational risks 
Shari`a Boards Set Shari'ah related rules 
and principles 
Oversee compliance with its 
verdict 
Others   
Depositors Good service 
Comparable returns 
Act responsibly 
Monitor the performance 
External Auditors Quality and quantity of 
information 
Transparency of information 
Evaluate the accuracy of the 
quality and quantity of 
information 
Shari`a Audit Adherence to the Shari`a Ensure compliance with the 
Shari`a Board verdicts. 
 
Source: Chapra, M. Umer, and Habib Ahmed. "Corporate governance in Islamic financial 
institutions." Occasional Paper No. 6, Jeddah, IRTI/IDB (2002).p15 
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Source: Chapra, M. Umer, and Habib Ahmed. "Corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions." Occasional Paper No. 6, Jeddah, IRTI/IDB (2002).p17
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